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ABSTRACT
I analyze the effects of bank mergers and competitive market structure after the Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act.
The first chapter studies the incentives to decide mergers and the effects of market
competition. Nationwide branching from deregulation and the resulting bank consolidation
have brought more a competitive market environment. In particular, branch networks
play an important role in bank merger analysis. Using commercial banks’ branch-level
location data in Texas from 1994 to 2005, I estimate a two-sided matching model of
merging and target banks with transferable utility. To study post-match values, I apply
the maximum score estimator developed by Fox (2010). I find the positive assortative
matching of bank sizes and I confirm that a bank prefers matching with target banks
that have geographically overlapping markets. Moreover, I extend the standard matching
model to incorporate externalities of market competition and the merger activities of rivals.
Competitive rivals lessen the effects of mergers but mergers that increase market power
have positive externalities on unmatched banks.
The second chapter develops a structural model of demand and supply for retail banking
to predict post-merger price. Ownership consolidation can affect not only price but also
product characteristics. Once demand parameters and price elasticities are estimated, the
adjustments in banking characteristics following mergers are considered in order to estimate
marginal costs. I apply Peters (2006) simulation methods to account for the discrepancy
between simulated merger changes and actual changes.
v
The third chapter builds on an entry model of Berry and Waldfogel (1999) to quantify
market competition. Significant consolidation waves after the Riegle-Neal Act brought a
decrease in the number of banking institutions, while the relaxation of branching regulations
almost doubled the number of bank branches and fortified market competition. When a new
branch with high quality enters, I analyze the effects of market deposit expansion, business
stealing from rival incumbent banks and cannibalization from other branches operated by
the same bank. I find evidence that business stealing effects dominate cannibalization effects
as market size increases. However, the impact of competition is localized and cannibalization
effects are rather reversed at remote distances.
vi
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Chapter 1
Bank Merger Incentives and Market Competition:
A Two-sided Matching Model with Externalities
1.1 Introduction
Throughout the past decade, the banking industry has undergone several changes in both
its structure and regulations. US banking regulation constrained bank growth through
restrictions on bank expansions both within states (intrastate banking and branching) and
between states (interstate banking and branching). One important change is the passage of
the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (IBBEA), which
permits nationwide branching as of June 1997. This federal law allows banks to expand
branch networks through merger and acquisition or de-novo branching, but some states
did not permit interstate banking through de-novo branching1. It means that a bank must
acquire another bank and merge the two structures in order to operate branches across
state lines. After these regulations lifted, there has been a considerable consolidation of the
banking industry. The total number of banking institutions declined in half from 10453 in
1994 to 5876 as of June 30, 2013 in U.S. In contrast, the number of branches are growing
steadily.
Although the Rielge-Neal act enables interstate and intrastate de-novo branching, most
of entries are made by mergers and most exits are absorbed by existing banks through
M&As. This massive consolidation has raised concerns over possible anti-competitive
1While twenty-five states adopt interstate branching by merger and acquisition as of 1997, only thirteen
states allowed interstate de-novo branching. By the end of 2005, twenty two states plus the District of
Columbia permitted de-novo branching
2effects of mergers. Given the importance of bank mergers in the economy, it is crucial for
researchers to understand the impacts of mergers.
On the basis of a sample for the period between 1994 and 2005, this paper examines
the effects of bank mergers. I focus on two issues. What are the consequences of mergers
on aspects of prices and banking markets. And second, I analyzes the incentives of bank
mergers and the competitiveness of local banking markets.
To investigate the behaviors of banks, I consider a two-sided matching model with
transferable utility and endogenous transfers (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). Banks are
partitioned into two sides, potential merging banks and target banks. In a merger, a bank
pays the transfer price in the exchange of obtaining new branches and assets. A target
bank is paid the transfer price and exits the market. A bank faces a trade-off between the
match synergy value and the transfer. Banks on both sides care about whether they match
with the right partners in a matching model. Specifically, an one-to-one matching model
is considered for the analysis. For an extension to enhance the explanation of a matching
model, potential merging banks can choose whether to match with target banks or stay
unmatched. Two-sided matching models are pervasive in empirical analyses, for example,
the marriage market (Becker, 1973), the venture capital market (Sorensen, 2007), loan
market between bank and firm (Chen and Song, 2013), and mutual funds (Park, 2012) and
bank mergers (Akkus et al., 2013).
Manski (1975) introduces a semi-parametric maximum score estimation for discrete
choice models. The estimator of Manski (1975) is consistent when choice probabilities are
rank ordered by choice payoffs but suffers from a dimensionality problem. Fox (2010b)
introduces the maximum score estimator to estimate a matching model and provides
solutions for the dimensionality problem. Fox’s (2010b) maximum score estimators use
pairwise stable inequalities regarding the match values implied by matching equilibrium.
The equilibrium is a consequence of single-agent best responses. The match values in
matching equilibrium are greater than any other values from switching partners. The
post-merger value functions from a match transform observable bank-specific attributes
3and match-specific covariates into outputs.
The main contributions of this paper are two-fold. First, I analyze the critical incentives
to determine the match value by using branch-level data of commercial banks in Texas
from 1994 to 2005. In a sense, the most relevant paper is Akkus et al. (2013), which
use revealed preferences of buyer and target banks in a two-sided matching market with
incorporating transfer data and indicates that mergers have greater match value if markets
overlap more. Without transfer data, the value of the score is invariant to scaling of the
parameters. Parameters show the relative importance of each attribute that contributes
for match synergy values. My paper finds the evidence that bank size and operating cost
measures have positive assortative matching. This finding suggests that large banks tend
to match with larger target banks and small banks tend to match with small banks. Also,
banks with high operating cost efficiency prefer to merge with target banks with better
cost efficiency. And banks merging with target banks that have geographically overlapped
markets, have higher match values.
Second, I incorporate market competition as externalities. It is because externalities
rely on the entire assignment of all firms and all matches. Since deregulation lifted entry
barriers, banks can expand geographical markets into new counties, new MSA, new states,
which encourages the level of competition in banking industry. Even though banks can
diversify branch networks and risks across many geographical markets, banks are relatively
more exposed to competitive rivals. The existence of competing rivals influences behaviors
of other banks. Standard matching models focus only on merger-target match values and do
not fully take into account the rivalry nature of competitive banks. With only pre-merger
characteristics, I can obtain the restrictive results. Banks care not only about whether they
can merge or not, but also whether other rival banks merge. To allow for externalities, the
match product function is a function of the characteristics of banks in a match and entire
assignment. There have been challenges to apply externalities on matching models. Baccara
et al.(2012) study matching faculty members to offices in a new building with network
externalities. Uetake and Watanabe (2012) incorporate post-merger negative competition
4externalities on profit.
My paper considers rivals’ merger activities as well as market competition into the
matching model. From the previous literature (Kim and Singal, 1993; Hannan and Praeger,
1998; Sapienza, 2002), non-merging banks change the price according to merger activities of
rivals sharing same markets. Prior literature shows that unmatched rival banks follow the
strategy of merging banks. My paper finds the evidence that competitive rivals lessen the
post-merge values. Also, merger activities of rivals have different impacts on merging banks
and unmatched banks. Active merger activities in the same market weaken the merger
effects of the merging bank. But merger activities that increase market power in local
markets have positive externalities on unmatched banks.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2, I explain the banking industry in
brief. In section 3, the description for the data are provided and bank specific measures
are introduced. In section 4, structural matching model and maximum score estimator are
presented. In section 5, several hypotheses are tested prior to estimating the matching
model. Section 6 presents the estimation results. Section 7 provides brief concluding
remarks.
1.1.1 Related Literature
My paper adds to several strands of literature. The first strand of the related literature is
the literature on bank mergers in terms of price change. Most papers focus on the ex-post
price and performance change of the consolidated banks and rivals. Focarelli and Panetta
(2003) investigate the pricing effects of M&As in Italian banks and find that short-run
effects generate negative price changes to consumers but efficiency gains through mergers
lead to favorable price change in the long run. Sapienza (2002) and Erel (2011) analyze the
effects of mergers on loan spread, but reach different results. Sapienza (2002) finds that
horizontal mergers with small targets resulted in lower loan rate in Italy. Banks, however,
reduce lending to small borrowers after mergers. On the other hand, Erel (2011) notes
that the reduction in loan spreads is significant only for small loans, and finds that larger
5acquirer does not drop small business lending of smaller targets. In addition, he points out
that in-market and out-of-market mergers have different effects on market structure and
efficiency.
Another strand of the literature about merger is about analyzing the welfare effects.
Traditional economic theory compares in-market mergers with market expansion mergers
(out-of-market merger). The prior literature has identified ex-ante characteristics that affect
the magnitude of the two off-setting effects, market power and cost efficiency. Williamson
(1968) points that geographical overlap is a key component to determine which effect
dominates. Hannan and Prager (1998) find the evidence that bank mergers can lead
to an increase in market power and a reduction in deposit interest rates which would
counterbalance this effect.
Also, there is literature to investigate rivals’ reactions following mergers. Kim and Singal
(1993), Hannan and Praeger (1998) show that merging banks do not pass efficiency gain
to customers so merging banks lower deposit interest rate after merger. And non-merging
banks sharing same overlapping markets lower deposit rates. Kahn et al. (2002) examine
systematic tendency between acquirors, targets and un-exposed (unmatched) banks. Also,
the literature considering the extent of competition between banks includes Cohen and
Mazzeo (2007b). They endogenize the operating decisions of three types of depository
institutions and analyzed how the competitive effect influences market structure across the
bank types in the rural areas.
There are several papers estimating two-sided matching models. Most papers estimate
matching models with transferable utility. Becker (1973) studies the one-to-one marriage
markets between men and women. Sorensen (2007) investigates the matching between
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs and Park (2012) analyzes mutual fund merger markets.
Chen and Song (2013) find positive assortative matching of firm sizes and geographical
proximity and banks prefer firms that had the prior loan relationship. Sasaki and Toda
(1996), and Hafalir (2008) are the only papers that investigates a two-sided matching model
with externalities. Both papers propose an ”estimation function” to model how neighboring
6players (rivals) react to a player’s deviation. Uetake and Watanabe (2012) consider banking
matching models between incumbents and potential entrants (merger by entry) in rural
banking markets with non-transferability and incorporate post-merger negative competition
externalities. Akkus et al. (2013) are close to mine in that they study bank mergers with
transfer data. My paper adds to these papers by incorporating externalities considering the
incentives of bank mergers.
1.2 Industry Background
The banking Industry has experienced a regulatory and structural change after the Riegle-
Neal act in 1994. The RN Act include both interstate and intrastate de-regulations. Before
1990s, the banking industry in the U.S. were highly fragmented. Most of banks tend to
concentrate their banking activities in specific geographic areas. After the passage of the
Riegle-Neal Act enabled nationwide branching as of June 1997, there has been significant
consolidation in the U.S. banking industry.
1.2.1 Massive consolidation Trends
One clear trend of the commercial banking industry after the 1990s is the continuous drop
in the number of banking institutions. At the same time, the size of existing banks has
been increased steadily. This decline in the number of banks is evidenced by the exit and
entry rate. Figure 1 shows that after 1980s, the number of total banking institutions has
continued declining in Texas and all around the U.S. But the number of branches has grown.
Specifically, the number of branches in Texas has been increased tremendously after the
late 1980s. The average number of branches in Texas has grown from 3.63 in 1995 to 7.86
in 2005. Figure 1 presents the time series of entry and exit rate in U.S and Texas. The exit
and entry rate is calculated as a fraction of the banking population in the previous year.2.
Dunne et al. (1989) report that the average entry rate is 14−19 % annually and the exit
2The data of issuance of new bank charters, and other charter additions and deletions are came from
FDIC Historical Statistics on Banking (www.fdic.gov/hsob)
7rate is lower on average than entry rates in most industries. However, I find that the exit
rate is much higher than the entry rate in banking industry. Figure 3 (a) shows that most
of the bank exits have taken place through mergers and presents that the number of banks
mergers is peaked around 1997 at the time that the RN Act became effective and decreases
steadily since 1999. Figure 3 (b) shows that the percentage of within-state merger among
total mergers in T.X stayed at 100 % but dropped 80−90 % after interstate branching was
allowed in 1998. In 2011, the fraction of with-in state mergers dropped around 60 %.
1.2.2 Concentration and Geographical Market Expansion
Figure 4 provides further evidence of market concentration by contrasting the Lorenz curve3
of deposits in 1995 with that in 2000 and 2005 for Harrison county, which is the one of the
biggest counties in Texas, and for the Texas state. In figures, both markets become more
concentrated. The portion of fringe banks in the deposit market share decreases steadily
and larger dominant banks cover almost 80 % of total market shares by the end of the
sample. Table 1 presents the number of commercial banks and market shares by asset size.
I find that the number of large banks increases from 5% to almost 20%, but the number of
small banks decreased significantly. I can infer that banks that exit tend to be small, and
surviving banks tend to be the larger banks that were able to expand into other markets.
Table 2 displays the summary statistics of commercial banks in Texas. The number of
counties each bank engages has grown from 1.6 in 1995 to 2.6 in 2005.
1.3 Description of the Data and Variables
I focus on the period of massive consolidation that occurred following the Riegle-Neal Act
of 1994. The dataset used is a panel of banking institutions between 1994 and 2005.
3The closer the curves to the y-axis, the more asymmetric ,ant therefore the more concentrated, the
market becomes
81.3.1 Data
The data cover commercial banks and their mergers in Texas state, U.S. from 1994 to
2005 and compiled from three different sources. First, information on bank ownership and
deposits can be obtained from Summary of Deposits (SOD) as of June 30th of each year
at Federal Deposit Insurance Cooperation (FDIC). This provides deposits by branch and
the addresses of the branches for each bank and thrift. Also the location of headquarters,
whether a bank belongs to a bank holding company, and whether a bank was a former
savings associations are obtained. I exclude saving associations 4 and comprise only FDIC
insured banks that had at least one branch in my analysis. Since boundaries of counties
have been relatively static and the movement of each bank differs between urban and rural
counties, I define a county as a geographic unit for my analysis. Texas state has 254 counties.
Also, I take account of branches as brick and mortar offices with full service. I exclude
branches with limited service such as drive-through facilities, consumer credit offices and
branches for home banking.5.
Data on mergers are obtained from the history of each commercial bank provided by the
FDIC. The National Information Center (NIC) and FDIC record the history of all depository
institutions that ever existed in the United States. This information includes mergers,
acquisitions and bankruptcy, and allows me to identify all the merger cases and to define
which banks are active or passive. Table 4 shows an example of bank history. Each bank is
given a unique number from FDIC (Certificate #) or FED ID number (RSSD9001). When a
merge between banks ocurrs, the certificate number of passive (target) bank disappears and
becomes part of an existing (merging) bank.6 Thus combined balance sheets and unified
4The strategies and products that saving associations deal with are different from commercial banks.
5Each branch in SOD data has unique number and the type of service each office provide is identified.
After on-line banking is popular since early 2000s, on-line banking deposits increase significantly. The
percentage of brick and mortar offices has decreased to 89 % in 2005 from 97 % in 1994. Offices with deposits
above 1 billion dollars are excluded from analysis. Deposits from Internet banking are counted under specific
home-banking branches, but these offices never deal with individual customers in local markets. These
branches disrupt the analysis of banking markets.
6I distinguish between mergers and acquisitions because they have different motivations. Only mergers
that involve the full integration of bidder and target banks are counted for this analysis. When previously
independent bidder and target banks merge, target banks lose its charter after merger and become part of
9branch networks are recorded under the certificate number of active bank. Even though
the name of the bank can be changed after the merger, the certificate number is consistent.
To construct bank mergers, I exclude bank failures and mergers with assistance cases7.
Even if a bank merger is a mutual contract between a merging bank and a target bank,
all of the merger applications must be approved by one or more regulatory agencies8 For
example, FDIC9 has determined that the transaction would not result in a monopoly or
further any combination or conspiracy to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize the
business of banking in any part of the United States ,and that the transaction would not
have the effect in any section of the country to substantially lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly or in any other manner to restrict competition. (Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Merger Decisions Annual Report To Congress)10 Table 5 shows the
examples of approved merger applications by FDIC.
Finally, I use additional bank-level data regarding balance sheets and income statements
from the Report on Condition and Income (known as Call Reports) and Thrift Financial
Reports in June from the Federal Reserve Board. Call Reports contain information on
assets, interest expenses on deposits, interests income from loans, total employees and
non-interest expenses including wages and premises. Some bank performance related indexes
are also contained: ROA, net charge-off rates and loan loss provision. All financial data
are on an individual bank basis. I estimate the bank-level deposit interest rate as the ratio
of interest-expenses to total domestic deposits. Similarly, the interest rate on Loans can
bidder banks and have the same balance sheet with a unified branch network. Thus, Fox (2010b) and my
model assume a full transfer model. Park (2012) uses a fixed shared rule instead of a full transferable utility
in mutual fund industry.
7A failing institution is absorbed into an acquiring institution that receives FDIC assistance. Assisted
mergers were the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation’s preferred resolution method. Therefore,
the acquiring institution is not responsible for unpaid assessments of the failed institution.
8Agarwal et al (2012) find that inconsistent regulators hamper the effectiveness of regulations. The
fact that banks with national charters are subject to different regulatory procedures than banks with state
charters increase the cost of mergers between banks of different charter types.
9When the result of a merger will be a national bank, the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) must
approve the merger. When the result will be a state chartered, Federal Reserve member bank, the Fed must
approve the merger. And when the result will be a state, non member bank, the FDIC and state authorities
must both approve the merger. The Federal Reserve must approve all bank holding company acquisitions.
10Additional report can be downloaded from the FDIC’s Public Information Center’s website at
www.fdic.gov/news/publications/public/index
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be calculated as the ratio of interest-revenue to net loans. Each bank must maintain an
allowance (reserve) for loan and lease losses that is adequate to absorb estimated credit
losses associated with its loan and lease portfolio. Thus, net loans are defined as total loans
minus unearned income and loan loss allowances (provisions). Service fees are calculated
as the ratio of service charges on deposit accounts to total deposits. The interest rates
and service fees are all calculated as one year rates. I also use the bank’s total number of
branches and employees to calculate the number of employees per branch.
Demographic data at the county level are taken from US Census 2000 and Bureau of
Economics Analysis. This provides median household income and total population for each
county in Texas.
1.3.1.1 Sample Selection
The unit of observation for this analysis is the match between a merging bank and a target
bank. To make the geographic analysis more tractable, I restrict the sample to the state of
Texas. This enables econometricians to look closely on tracking the movement of rival banks
after mergers. Texas is one of the largest state, consisting of 254 counties. Even if Texas
passed the deregulation law of 1994 on Aug, 28, 1995 for intrastate branching, the Riegle-
Neal Act allowed states to ”opt-out” of interstate branching by passing a law to prohibit it
before June 1, 1997. A state that ”opted-out” of interstate branching prevented both state
and national banks from branching into or out of its borders. Texas and Montana were the
only states to ”opt-out” of interstate branching. But they subsequently adopted inter-state
branching in 1998 and 2002. Figure 3 (b) shows the evidence that % of within-state mergers
dropped first from 100% in 1998.
I drop observations for U.S branches of foreign institutions, branches which have zero
deposits or zero premises expenses. Also, I drop the very few branches for which the Summary
of Deposits data does not match with Call Report data. My sample consists of 8598 banks
from 1994 to 2005 in Texas. This process yields a total of 288 bank merger matches in
Texas. To test the impact of merger activities on rival banks, I include unmatched banks in
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sample. In estimation of the matching model, the maximum score estimator maximizes the
number of inequalities comparing observed sum of match values with counter-factual sum of
match values. Thus, sample selection requires to check whether a merger meets the criteria.
I exclude possible matches of bank mergers that involve market concentration severe enough
to violate U.S Antitrust Guidelines (HHI>1800 and ∆HHI>200) under counter-factual
assignment11. The MSA-level deposit HHI (Herfindahl Hirschman Index) is the standard
tool used in antitrust analysis.
I classify banks into merging banks, unmatched banks and target banks. Merging and
target banks are observed in the data. Unmatched banks in sample are among potential
merging banks that have operated in same and contiguous markets where target banks
engaged before merger. I construct selected sample which consists of 937 unmatched cases
and 1225 banks in total for matching models. Table 6 displays the summary statistics of 3
classified group of banks.
1.3.2 The Characteristics of Bank and Market Structure
It is believed that bank performance and risk measures are closely related with geographic
networks. Before investigating the incentives of bank mergers, I describe some measures of
the bank characteristics and market structure.
1.3.2.1 Cost Efficiency and Risk
Cost efficiency can be measured by non-interest expenses over assets. Non-interest expenses
include salaries to their employees, expenses on premises and fixed assets and other non-
interest expenses including advertising expenditures 12. Premises and equipment expenses
include expenses on utilities, janitorial services, repairs, furniture and maintenance. Other
expenses include legal fees, postage, deposit insurance assessments and directors’ fees.
11Akkus et al(2013) include HHIviolate, which equals the fraction of target MSAs for which a merger
with a merging bank would lead to Antitrust scrutiny, as a covariate term
12Only banks with advertising expenditure-to operating income over 1% are required to report their
advertising expenditures to the supervisory authorities.
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Although on-line banking has increased tremendously after late 1990s and ATM networks
take the place of many roles of offices,branching is the most effective tool to collect deposits.
Ho and Ishii (2011) estimate a spatial model of consumer demand for retail bank deposits
that accounts for consumer’s dis-utility from distance traveled. These operating costs
stem from geographical networks of branches. Also, Dick (2006) finds that the number
of employees per branch and a bank’s geographic diversification affect significantly the
consumer’s utility. Average number of employees per branch or wages are indicators for
bank quality. Wages are calculated based on the bank’s labor expenses and the number of
employees.
O¨rs(2003) argues that advertising increases bank profitability, and emphasizes that
non-price competition through advertisement plays an important role in the banking
industry. According to surveys by the American Bankers Association, roughly 1% of
bank operating costs, on average, was devoted to advertising in 1996, while total bank
marketing expenditures were close to $4 billion in 2001. (Dick, 2007) Thus, the high
ratio of non-interest expenses over asset indicates that the bank provides better service for
consumers.
Another measure of bank performance is credit risk from loan portfolios. This is
measured by loan loss provisions or charged-off losses over loans. Loan charge-offs are bad
debts and negatively affect earnings. Also, a non-performing loan ratio measured by the
sum of loans over ninety days late and loans not accruing over total loans can be used.
Aguirregabiria et al. point out that diversification of geographic risks is another motivation
for banks to determine branch networks. They introduce a new measure of risk to identify
bank preferences towards geographic deposit risk separately from the costs of geographical
expansion of branch networks.
1.3.2.2 Market Competition
When analyzing the impact of mergers among incumbent banks, it is crucial to incorporate
market competition and market structure simultaneously into a model. How do I measure
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the degree of market competition and what is the relation with concentration? A standard
measure of market concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI, herein)13. HHI
index gives more weight to changes in market shares of the largest banks since large banks
have greater shares. When taking account of market structure, it is traditionally believed
that the relation between competition and concentration is inversely related. But, the
impact of mergers cannot be fully captured by measuring the change in concentration only.
Even though the merger causes an obvious increase in concentration in market shares, but
pro-competitive mergers occasionally observed.
Banks compete in retail markets by setting interest rates and the number of branches.
Then a tough rivalry reduces the interest rates and competition is enhanced. The traditional
entry literature models the profit function as a decreasing function of the number of
active operating firms. The number of firms or dominant firms are used to measure
market competition. Cohen and Mazzeo (2007a, 2007b) propose a model of monopolistic
competition in branching to estimate the competitive response of banks. Dick (2006) points
out that the basic market structure hasn’t been affected throughout nationwide branching
but the growth in the tail of small banks are noticeable. Figure 4 shows the Lorenz curve
for deposits. The number of dominant banks is virtually unchanged between year 1995 and
year 2000. Cerasi et al. (2011) propose a new measure of competition to address the impact
of mergers on competition.
1.3.3 Market Overlap Between Mergers and Competition
Post-merger bank values and consumers’ welfare depend on the motives underlying the
banks’ decision to consolidate. To study the effects of consolidation, it is important to check
why banks want to merge. A bank can enter new markets for economies of scale and cost
efficiency. The other motive is to acquire market power through obtaining new branches
in the same market. The net effects of mergers depend on whether the market power or
13HHI is the sum of squared market shares and captures the degree of concentration in branching at the
local market level.
14
efficiency effect dominates. One important condition that determines the increase to the
acquiring bank’s market power is whether it operates in the same markets as the target
bank.
1.3.3.1 In-Market vs Out-Of-Market Mergers
I define in-market merger in which branches of each bank serve in the same markets
before merger. When target and merging banks do not have any geographical overlap
and consolidated banks penetrate new markets through merger, it is called Out-of-Market
Mergers or market-expansion mergers. Two types of mergers are likely to produce different
effects on market structure, which in turn affect prices and products of merging banks and
rivals. These effects are closely related the post-merger bank’s value14.
In-market mergers have much more potential than out-of-market mergers for exercising
market power and creating efficiency gains. In-market mergers bring the loss of competition
that stems from more concentrated markets after mergers ,and consolidated banks obtain
market power. Thus price15 will increase.
On the other hand, in-market mergers offer more opportunities for cost efficiency than
out-of market mergers. That is, the least efficient branches can be eliminated through
mergers. However, out-of-market mergers have different motives than do in-market mergers.
Out-Of-Market mergers happen when banks seek geographic diversification or efficiency
gains due to economies of scale.
If the cost efficiency gain dominates, merging banks will lower costs and lead to more
favorable price to customers. But if market power effect dominates, adverse price change is
observed. Separating in-market merger and out-of-market mergers(i.e. market-expansion) is
a relatively tricky task merger after geographical barriers have been lifted. Thus, measuring
14Agarwal et al (2012) and Akkus et al (2013) suggest that inconsistent regulators impose significant
implict costs on banks through regulations. To quantify the implicit costs of bank chartering through
frictions in the bank merger market, Akkus et al (2013) allows the merger value function to depend on
whether the acquirer and target have the same type of charter and regulated by the same regulator.
15bank j’s price in market m is defined as Pjm=loan interest ratejm + service fee ratejm - deposit interest
ratejm
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market-overlap is necessary to capture merger’s match value.
MktOverlapMer,Tar =
∑
h branch
Mer
h × 1[branchTarh > 0]∑
h branch
Mer
h
(1.1)
The market overlap index gives how many branches that the merging bank own in the
previous period, overlap with the branches of target banks. This measure of market overlap
has a maximum value of 1, when all branches exist in same markets (in-market mergers
only) and a minimum value of 0, when the buyer bank enters new markets (out-of-market
mergers only). Houston et al. (2001) use a similar equation with (3.1). Some papers
use deposit shares to calculate market overlap16. Definition of market is different across
papers17. I define markets’ geographic size as a county and market overlap is calculated
under county-level. Some studies analyze the importance of market overlap between the
target and acquiror on price. Houston and Ryngaert (2001) find indirect evidence that
in-market mergers are more profitable. Stock market returns are positively correlated with
the degree of geographical overlap between the target and the acquiror.
1.3.3.2 The Impact of Merger Effects on Rival Banks
An ownership change can affect rival banks in the same market. Previous research sug-
gests that rivals’ reaction differs according to dominating effects of mergers. In general
when market power effect prevails, the rivals adopt a ”follower” strategy, changing prices
unfavorably for customers. However if cost efficiency effects dominates, then rival banks
might be able to reduce prices to maintain their market share. When in-market mergers
happen, then merging banks can consolidate less efficient branches. Consumers move to the
16Hannan and Prager (1998) and Erel (2011) use deposit shares in each h markets and following statistic :
MktOverlap =
∑
hmin(Deposit
Mer
h ,Deposit
Tar
h )∑
h(Deposit
Mer
h
+DepositTar
h
)
17Most banking literature about consumer demand estimation conducts the analysis under MSA level
(Dick, 2006; Focarelli and Panetta, 2003; Erel, 2011). Ho and Ishii (2011) define a market to be a MSA, or
in rural areas to be a county. Cohen and Mazzeo (2007b) focus on rural markets and define market size as a
county.
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better managed banks. Thus unmatched rival banks also have an opportunity to remove
less competitive branches and consolidate branches to provide better service to compete
with consolidated banks. The effect of out-of-market mergers on rival banks is weaker than
in-market mergers.
RivalkMer =
∑
h 1[min(branchhk, branch
Tar
h ) > 0]× 1[Rivalinhk > 0]∑
h 1[min(branchhk, branch
Tar
h ) > 0]
(1.2)
Thus, merger activity index of rivals measures how many markets that each bank engages
in, are expected to be exposed to in-market merger activities after merger. Rivalinhk is a
dummy variable if the bank k’s rival banks merge with target banks as in-market mergers
in market h, and otherwise is zero.
1.4 Model
1.4.1 Two-sided, One-to-One Matching Model
I model bank mergers as one-to-one, two-sided matching with transferable utility. The
two-sided matching model exclusively partitions banks into two groups such as merging
firms (active) and target firms (passive). Firms on the one side of the group can match only
with the firms from the other group. The definition of transferable utility is that payoffs
to an opposite agent making a match are additively separable(quasi-linear) in the transfer
paid to that agent by its partner.
For a number of M markets, I denote a two-sided merger market using two finite
disjointed sets of firms : Merging(buying) group by A={a1,...,am} and target(merged)
group by T ={t1,...,tm}18. Both types of banks simultaneously maximize their expected
post-match values by making their matching decisions. Each merging bank matches with a
target bank.
In a two-sided matching game with an assignment E (can be called observed), consider
18Since I assume an one-to-one matching model between merging and target banks, dim(A)=dim(T )
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two merging banks ai, aj ∈ A , two target banks ti ,tj ∈ T , and the match reference
function is µm(ai) = ti and µm(aj) = tj , all in a matching market m . The match reference
function µm : A → T , an observed bijection assigning each merging bank to a particular
target partner in a market m. An assignment E is a physically possible set of matches.
Further, let E˜ (can be called counterfactual) be the assignment E except that {ai, µm(aj)}
and {aj , µm(ai)} match and {ai, µm(ai)} and {aj , µm(aj)} do not match .
Let fm
(
ai, µm(ai)
)
denotes the post-match production function which transforms the
merging bank ai’s endowment captured by firm attributes and the target bank ti’s char-
acteristics into some joint-output values shared between ai and ti. To allow externalities,
I write that firm ai’s post-match product function depends on the assignment E when
firm ai matches with downstream firm ti in an assignment E, and can be written as
fm
(
ai, µm(ai)|E
)
.
When a match(or merger) occurs, the merging bank ai earns match-product value
fm
(
ai, ti|E
)
even if it pays match price pai,ti to the target firm ti. And match price is
transferred to the target bank and ti exits the market. I assume that once target banks
leave the market, it is not allowed to enter banking markets again. Thus if ai and ti agreed
to match, the total match-value function (i.e. post-merger value) is the summation of the
merging bank’s payoff υu(ai, ti|E) and the target’s payoff υd(ai, ti|E) after merger . Most of
prior empirical assignment models assume that a fixed sharing rule predetermines how the
match synergy is split between the matched pair. The setting in this paper allows values
to be transferable so that the division of match-output is determined endogenously at the
time the match occurs and is different across matches.
fm
(
ai, ti|E
) ≡ υu(at, ti|E) + υd(ai, ti|E) (1.3)
υu(ai, ti|E) = fm
(
ai, ti|E)
)− pai,ti (1.4)
υd(ai, ti|E) = pai,ti (1.5)
An assignment E is a m×m matrix with elements em,m ∈ {0,1}, defined for all possible
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pairs {ai, tj} ∈ A × T , where ei,i =1 if ai and ti are matched and ei,j =0 if ai and tj are
unmatched for i, j = 1, ...,m. In my model setting, an assignment E is a diagonal matrix
so off-diagonal elements are all zero.
Definition 1.4.1. (Pairwise Stability) : An match µ is pairwise stable if it is individually
rational and is not blocked by any matching pair, i.e. for every pair (ai, ti), ti ∈ µm(ai)
fm
(
ai, µm(ai)|E
)− pai,ti ≥ fm(ai, µm(aj)|E˜)− pai,tj
for all j 6= i and tj ∈ µm(aj)
The intuition for this condition is that an assignment is stable if no pair of counter-
factual bank can break off the current matching and be both strictly better off under a new
assignment when they (counter-factual) are matched.
Since every firm is assumed to behave rationally, merging firm ai’s best response is that
matching with ti (which is, observed) have a higher value than any other matches (which is,
counter-factual ). And an assignment is stable. For target bank tj to match with aj , the
match price p(aj , tj) must be strictly greater than any other offer from ai.When bank ai
merges with ti, the transfer price pai,ti must be weakly greater than any other offers from a
competing bank, i.e. paj ,ti . Also, the merging bank ai doesn’t have to pay strictly more
than the transfer paj ,ti to the target bank ti because higher transfer reduces the bank ai’s
payoff. Thus paj ,ti = υ
d(aj , ti|E˜) = υd(ai, ti|E) = pai,ti .
This revealed preference matching equilibrium gives the inequalities like
υu(ai, µm(ai)|E) ≥ υu(ai, µm(aj)|E˜), (1.6)
that is,
υu(ai, µm(ai)|E)−pai,ti ≥ υu(ai, µm(aj)|E˜)−{υd(ai, µm(ai)|E)+pai,ti−υd(aj , µm(ai)|E˜)}.
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For a merging bank aj , I use the same logic to obtain a similar inequality
υu(aj , µm(aj)|E) ≥ υu(aj , µm(ai)|E˜),
that is,
υu(aj , µm(aj)|E)−paj ,tj ≥ υu(aj , µm(ai)|E˜)−{υd(aj , µm(aj)|E)+paj ,tj−υd(ai, µm(aj)|E˜)},
where I use υd(ai, tj |E˜) = υd(aj , tj |E) = paj ,tj . Adding two inequalities (1.6) and (1.7)
leaves, as the transfers paj ,tj and pai,ti cancel out,
υu(ai, µm(ai)|E) + υu(aj , µm(aj)|E) ≥ υu(ai, µm(aj)|E˜ + υu(aj , µm(ai)|E˜)
− {υd(ai, µm(ai)|E) + υd(aj , µm(aj)|E)}
+ {υd(aj , µm(ai)|E˜) + υd(ai, µm(aj)|E˜)}
Rearranging two of the v’s and substituting in the Definition 1.4.1 and equation (1.3),
fm
(
ai, µm(ai)|E
) ≡ υu(ai, µm(ai)|E)+ υd(ai, µm(ai)|E), leaves
Definition 1.4.2. The matches (ai, ti) and (aj , tj) satisfy local production maximization,
that is,
fm
(
ai, µm(ai)|E
)
+ fm
(
aj , µm(aj)|E
) ≥ fm(ai, µm(aj)|E˜)+ fm(aj , µm(ai)|E˜). (1.7)
This Definition (1.9) says that if I take any two pairs that are matched in a pairwise
stable outcome and switch the partners, the observed sum of match values is greater than or
equal to the counter-factual sum of match values after the swap. This condition illustrates
the fact that in a matching market, the decision of two firms to team up depends on their
effective choice sets, which are constrained by the decisions of other firms in the market. This
equilibrium is called local production maximization not derived from a complete equilibrium
concept, but from single agent best responses and transferable utility. This characterization
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of the equilibrium matching is the basis for the estimation method described in the next
section.
1.4.2 Objective Function for the Match Value Function
In order to form the empirical analog of definition (1.9), I first parameterize the match value
function F (ai, ti) as equation (1.8) below. In section 4.3, I will introduce the maximum score
estimator that maximizes the match product function (objective function) computationally.
One of the biggest advantages of the maximum score estimator is that an objective function
can be set up easily. An objective function has following forms F (ai, ti) = fm(ai, ti) + ai,ti
F (ai, ti) = βwWaiWti + βcCovariates(ai, ti) + γ1Xai + γ2Xti + ai,ti (1.8)
where Wai = (Wa1i ,Wa2i ,Wa3i) is an attribute vector of the merging bank ai and
Wti = (Wt1i ,Wt2i ,Wt3i) is the same attribute vector for the target ti, Xai and Xti are
buyer-specific and target-specific covariates, Covariates(ai, ti) is a vector of match-specific
covariates and at is an unobserved match-specific error term that is assumed as independent
across matches. These match-specific error terms are added to the specification of the
match value function in order to allow the empirical model to give full support to the data.
Bank fixed effects are observed by the each bank but unknown to the econometricians.
These bank-specific fixed effects enter into both sides of inequality and cancel out, so they
are unidentified. Theoretically bank fixed effect are valued equally by all potential mergers
and differencing them out leaves the matching unaffected.
A match product function F describes how the characteristics of the target firm and
endowment of the merging firm can be combined to generate a matching output. To capture
the operating aspects of the size measure, I use the value of assets as the major measure for
bank size. Asset size of banks and the number of branches are included in bank-specific
attributes. Also, several bank performance measures : loan loss provision (risk) and cost
efficiency are applicable to interaction terms Wai ,Wti . I consider a market overlap measure
21
between merging and target banks for match-specific covariates Covariates(ai, ti).
However, for a pairwise maximization matching without transfer data, non-interaction
terms such as γ1 and γ2 are unidentified. A matching between buyer and target firms
exchange money transfers instead of acquiring target’s branches , but it is common not to
open transfer data to the public. It can be another advantage that maximum score estimator
explains the match value function well without transfer data. This paper estimates the
matching model without transfer data19
The interaction terms and match-specific covariates capture the match-specificity for
post-merger value studied in this paper. These can be identified by comparisons between
observed and counter-factual matches in maximum score estimation.
The cross-partial derivatives on the interaction terms reflect the observed matching
pattern on the target bank. One of the primitives that govern a two-sided matching game
is the concept of complementarity vs substitution. Complementarity implies that the
cross-derivatives are positive.
∂2F (ai, ti)
∂Wain∂Wtin
= βw,n > 0 , (n = 1, 2, 3, 4) (1.9)
Substitution, on the other hand, implies negative cross-partial derivatives and anti-
assortative matching.
If I allow for externalities and use no transfer data, an objective function can be extended
as
F (ai, ti|E) = βwWaiWti + βcCovariates(ai, ti)
+ ω1Mktcompetition(ai, ti|E) + ω2Rival(ai, ti|E) + ai,ti
(1.10)
19The maximum score estimator proposed by Fox (2010a, 2010b) does not use transfer data. But, Akkus
et al. (2013) demonstrate that estimator with transfer gives more precise results and can identify parameters
that cannot be identified without transfer data.
22
For unmatched case, I can input W0=1 for Wti ,then
F (ai, 0|E) = βWai + ω1Mktcompetition(ai, 0|E) + ω2Rival(ai, 0|E) + ai,0
1.4.3 Estimation of Matching Model
To estimate F , I apply a semi-parametric approach, i.e the maximum score estimation
developed by Fox (2010b). When I deal with N upstream firms and N downstream firms
in a matching market, then N2 matches and N! assignments should be considered. For
example, in one-to-one matching involving 100 firms on each side, then there are 100!=9.33×
10157 possible assignments. Computational issues in matching games restricts the use of
matching methods, but computationally simple, maximum score estimator was investigated
by Fox (2010a, 2010b). This pairwise maximum score objective function produces the same
objective function value which compares pairs of two choice scores and generates (N−1)×N2
necessary inequalities. Estimation uses the empirical analog of the sum of match product
inequalities definition (1.4.2). Specifically the maximum score estimator βˆ maximizes the
following maximum score objective function.
Q(β) =
M∑
m=1
am−1∑
ai=1
am∑
aj=ai+1
1[f(ai, µm(ai)|E, β) + f(aj , µm(aj)|E, β)
≥ f(ai, µm(aj)|E˜, β) + f(aj , µm(ai)|E˜, β)]
(1.11)
I first specify the product function up to the parameter vector β. β describes the observed
matching pattern in the bank merger markets and thus reveals the relative degrees of
complementaries or substitutability between merging and target bank attributes and match-
specific covariates. β is structurally identified in the main analysis.
I define the parameter space to be Ω =Rχ, where χ is the number of parameters to be
estimated. Thus maximum score estimation searches across Ω to find βˆ that maximizes the
number of pairwise stable inequalities. In other words the estimation algorithm picks βˆ
that makes the observed match best ”fit” the equilibrium outcome in terms of the pairwise
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stable conditions.
The pairwise maximum score estimator βˆ is a consistent estimator for β0, the true
parameters in the data generating process if the model satisfies Manski’s rank order property.
Statistical consistency of the maximum score estimators rely on the assumption that the
error terms follow the rank-order property. The structure unobservable is not modeled up
for matching model.20 Fox (2010a) provides proofs of set identification and consistency for
maximum score estimators in a two-sided matching model.
Since Akkus et al.(2013) and Fox (2010b) conduct Monte Carlo experiments for esti-
mators without transfer data as well as with transfer data. And show that multinomial
maximum score estimator is a tractable and useful procedure. Without transfer data, the
value of the score is invariant to the scaling of the parameters. The scale is never identified
and estimation requires a normalization for one of the coefficients that must have a nonzero
contribution to preferences.
The objective function is a step function, and I solve the maximization problem using
the differential evolution (DE) algorithm performed by NMaximize function in Mathematica.
Specifically I modified toolkit developed by Fox and Santiago (2014).
1.4.3.1 Subsampling Confidence Intervals
Aside from the original work of Manski (1975), Kim and Pollard (1990) show that the
maximum score estimator converges slowly at the rate n1/3 and has a very complex limiting
distribution from which to draw inference. As Delgado, Rodriguez-Poo and Wolf (2001)
show, subsampling method makes consistent inference available on the maximum score
estimator. The detailed overview of subsampling is referred to Politis, Romano and Wolf
(1999).
I use the subsampling method to construct the confidence intervals for the estimates in
the match model. Since the data ranges from 1994 to 2004, 6 years out of those 11 years
20Bajari, Fox and Ryan(2006) show that estimation can allow for agent-specific fixed effects over nests of
alternatives.
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are chosen as elements in subsamples. The number of subsamples to use in constructing
the approximation to the estimator’s distribution is set to 200. The matching estimation
toolkit of Fox and Santiago (2014) is applied to implementing subsampling inference for the
point maximum score estimates. The results are presented in section 5.
1.4.4 Extensions of Standard Matching Model
1.4.4.1 Un-matching Outside-Option
In data, I observe which bank merges with which target bank and which bank stays
unmatched. To extend the standard merger matching model, I add un-matching outside
option for each bank. Each bank chooses the best option out of two options {merge, not
merge}. Thus a bank in my sample should be included under either Gm(set of merging
firm) or Gum(set of unmatched firm) upon its choice and even one firm was included in
Gum set this period but it never affects next period’s choices
Similar to the match-only cases in section 4.1, I denote the potential merging group by
A={a1,...,am, am+1, ..., ap} and the target (merged) banks by T ={t1,...,tm}. In this case,
dim(A)>dim(T ) since there are m merging firms that match with target banks and p−m
unmatched banks in A. In a two sided matching game with assignment E, consider two
potential merging banks ai ∈ Gm and ap ∈ Gum. Econometricians can observe which banks
can be categorized to Gm group and Gum group.
The match reference function µm : A → T ∪ ∅ , a bijection assigning each potential
merging bank to a particular target partner(bank) in marketm or empty set (i.e. unmatched).
Further, let E˜ (counter-factual) be the assignment E except that {ai, 0} unmatched and
{ap, µm(ai)} match.
For an unmatched firm ap ∈ Gum, ap’s best response indicates that the unmatched
value function fm
(
ap, 0|E
)
gives higher values than matching with targets. So this revealed
preference matching equilibrium gives the pairwise stable inequality :
fm
(
ap, 0|E
) ≥ fm(ap, µm(ai)|E˜)− pap,ti (1.12)
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For merging bank ai ∈ Gm, matching with ti = µm(ai) has a higher post-match value
than any other matches including un-matched. Then pairwise stable inequality gives
fm
(
ai, µm(ai)|E
)− pai,ti ≥ fm(ai, 0|E˜) (1.13)
Arranging above two inequalities (1.12) and (1.13), then I can obtain pairwise stable
inequality similar to Definition (1.4.2).
fm
(
ai, µm(ai)|E
)
+ fm
(
ap, 0|E
) ≥ fm(ai, 0|E˜)+ fm(ap, µm(ai)|E˜) (1.14)
For the estimation with un-matched banks, the maximum score objective function can be
extended to following forms.
Q(β) =
M∑
m=1
am−1∑
ai=1
am∑
aj=ai+1
1[aj ∈ Gum]× [fm
(
ai, µm(ai)|E
)
+ fm
(
aj , 0|E
)
≥ fm
(
ai, 0|E˜
)
+ fm
(
aj , µm(ai)|E˜
)
]
+ 1[(aj ∈ Gm]× [f(ai, µm(ai)|E, β) + f(aj , µm(aj)|E, β)
≥ f(ai, µm(aj)|E˜, β) + f(aj , µm(ai)|E˜, β)]. (1.15)
1.4.4.2 Incorporating Externalities
If firms are under competitive condition, then the decision of other firms to match may
raise post-merge utilities of other firms if the merger reduces competition. Or lower the
profits of rivals if consolidation produces a lower cost competitor. Banks care not only
about whether they can merge, but also about whether rival banks merge or not. The idea
of such an effect is that the behavior (or characteristics) of a household/firm is influenced
by the behavior of others in the same neighborhood.
Economists have long been concerned with the identification of endogenous social effects.
These effects have been called ”peer effects”, ”neighborhood effects” or ”externalities”
depending on the context. Manski (1993) termed this an endogenous effect, i.e. that
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the propensity of an individual to behave in some way varies with the prevalence of the
behavior in the group. He analyzes the problem of identifying endogenous social effects from
observations of the distribution of behavior in a population. These neighborhood effects
are important with regard to amplify the effects of changes in households’ or firm choices.
Following Manski (1993), neighborhood effects are known as a ”social multiplier”.21
Because the post-match value of a bank depends on market competition from rival
banks as well as firm’s matching, I need to incorporate externalities into the matching
model. Since competing rivals depend on the entire assignment that include all other firms’
matches, market competition and rivals’ merger activities are regarded as externalities in
matching models.
When externalities are present, a deviating pair needs to consider how other agents will
react to the deviation. Before allowing externalities into the matching model, it is necessary
to define more assumptions for stable assignments. In order to reduce the computational
burden of maximum score estimator, Fox (2010b) assumes that there are no remaining
match changes once the assignment are determined. Then this assignment is called stable if
there is no trade to improve both firms regardless of the transfers, keeping all other matches
fixed.
Since externalities depend on assignment E and E˜, I need to assume firm beliefs about
counter-factual externalities. One of the significant challenges in considering externalities
in the matching models is that underlying effects of externalities are often unobservable
or difficult to pin down. Sasaki and Toda (1996), and Hafalir (2008) are the only papers
that investigates a two-sided matching model with externalities. Both papers propose
an ”estimation function” to model how neighboring players (rivals) react to a player’s
deviation. In the presence of externalities, a deviating player need to consider not only his
own matching but also about how other players react to the deviation because they affect
the blocking possibility of the match. Thus, a matching is stable if there exists no blocking
21Manski (1993) discussed three hypotheses to explain how groups may affect individuals: endogenous,
contextual, and correlated effects. Exogenous effects and correlated effects do not generate this ”social
multiplier”.
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pair in this sense. In Definition (1.4.2.), a merging bank ai believes that ti will match with
aj when ai drops ti and there is no time for target ti bank to find any other partner than
available aj bank after a merging bank ai drops ti. Thus, ti must match with aj .
However, preferences are defined over assignment rather than matching under externali-
ties environment. If a merging bank ai deviates to form a blocking pair with a target bank
tj , then a merging bank ai has to consider not only that a target bank tj has incentive to
be matched with a bank ai, but also what rival banks including ti would react after the
deviation. A merging bank ai’s expectations about the possible entire match changes after
the deviation are crucial.
I assumes that players in matching models are myopic and ignore the implications of
their choices on their peers’ selections. Consistent with Bacarra et al (2012), It implies that
network effects play no role in choice, but in payoffs.
For a number of M markets, I denote a two-sided merger market with externalities using
two finite disjointed sets of firms : Merging group by A={a1,...,am} and target group by
T ={t1,...,tm}. In a two-sided matching game with an assignment E, consider two merging
banks ai, aj ∈ A , two target banks ti, tj ∈ T . I denote an observed assignment µm(·|E) :
A → T , an observed bijection assigning each merging bank to a particular target partner
in a market m. The match reference function is µm(ai|E) = ti and µm(aj |E) = tj , all in a
matching market m.
For any assignment µ(·|E), I denote by µajai (|E˜), the counter-factual assignment derived
from µ(·|E) by exchanging the match partner of ai and aj .
µ
aj
ai (x|E˜) :=

µ(aj |E) if x = ai
µ(ai|E) if x = aj
µ(x|E) otherwise.
(1.16)
It implies that E˜ be the assignment E except that {ai, µm(aj)} and {aj , µm(ai)} match
and {ai, µm(ai)} and {aj , µm(aj)} do not match .
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Definition 1.4.3. (Pairwise Stability with Externalities) An assignment µ is pairwise stable
if it is individually rational and is not blocked by any matching pair, i.e. for every pair
(ai, ti) ∈ A× T , ti ∈ µm(ai). And the matches (ai, ti) and (aj , tj) satisfy local production
maximization, that is,
fm
(
ai, µ(ai|E)
)
+ fm
(
aj , µm(aj |E)
) ≥ fm(ai, µajai (ai|E˜))+ fm(aj , µajai (aj |E˜)). (1.17)
Further, I assume that the post-merger value with externalities take the following form.
fm
(
ai, µm(ai)|E
)
= Pm
(
ai, µm(ai)
)
+ ζRm
(
ai, µm(ai)|E
)
(1.18)
The first term is a function of match, buyer-target only, in absence of market structure.
In my model, buyer-specific ,target-specific attributes and match covariates are included
in the first term. The second term accounts for the effects of externalities induced by
assignment E. In fact, Rm
(
ai, µm(ai)|E
)
is an externalities function of effects of market
competition and rival banks’ merger activities.
Bacarra et al. (2012) give proofs that pair-wise stable assignment exists when match
value function is such that target-specific attributes are common to all mergers and the
effects of externalities are separably additive. Throughout my analysis, I assume that
market competition linearly depends on the average number of all commercial banks in
which counties that ai banks engages. Also, rival banks’ merger activities rely on matches
of other banks in same market. Then, equation (1.18) can be written as following
fm
(
ai, µm(ai)|E
)
= P (ai, µm(ai)) +
h=H∑
h=1
ζhkm
(
ai, µm(ai)|E
)
(1.19)
It is general in that externalities are additive separability and the coefficients ζh are not
restricted in sign so that effects can be either positive or negative. This formulation allows
for banks in close proximity to compete with other banks including merging and unmatched,
and to influence post-match values of rival banks.
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1.5 Findings
In this section, I test several hypotheses regarding the matching between merging banks
and target banks, and discuss the implications of my findings.
1.5.1 The Determinants of Mergers
I compare the motivations for mergers with ex-ante analysis of the characteristics of the
banks. I define a discrete variable(Event) that can take three values: merging banks, un-
matched banks and target banks. Following Focarelli et al. (2002), I estimate multinomial
logit estimation
Prob(Event = i, for i = 0, 1, 2) = F (Assets,Branches, Costs,Risk) (1.20)
where the function F is the logistic distribution. The coefficients are to be interpreted as
affecting the odds ratio with respect to the baseline case, not the marginal probability.
Table 6 reports the summary of merging banks(active), target banks and unmatched banks.
As expected, merging banks are big and target banks are small. Target banks have higher
risk (net charge-off rate) and low ROA (performance). Table 7 presents the multinomial
logit estimation results. Coefficients in column (1) show that the characteristics of merging
banks respect to the target banks. The results is consistent with summary statistics that
merging banks are larger and have higher quality. The positive and significant coefficients
of number of employee per branch, ROA and negative net charge-off rates imply that banks
with high profitability want to broaden customer services. Also, column (2) shows that
merging banks are more profitable than unmatched banks.
1.5.2 Empirical Analysis
To check the matching pattern between merging banks (active) and target banks (passive) in
the data, Table 8 reports the results of regressing merging bank characteristics on matched
target bank characteristics. It presents five specifications using different characteristic
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measures: log value of assets, number of branches, cost measures, risk measures for loan
loss provision and the number of employees per branch.
The coefficients on the five relevant interaction terms are all positive and significant.
For example, the asset size of the merging bank is positively and significantly related to the
asset size of the target bank. This results indicate that positive assortative matching exists
in the bank merger market. Off-diagonal intersection terms, such as between asset and risk
measure, turn out to be insignificant.
These results imply that sorting and matching pattern exists but it cannot disentangle
whether certain attributes contribute match value and whether target attributes affect
characteristics of merging bank after merger.
1.5.2.1 Profit Estimation
Post-merger value affects merging bank’s revenue in following merger period. I run primitive
OLS regression of profit after merger on buyer-target attributes. I can compute market
level profit of bank j in market m,
pijmt = Mmsjm(r
loan
j − rdepj + rserj )− cost (1.21)
where Mm is market-size, total deposits from market m, sjm is the market-share of bank
j in market m, rloanj is the loan-interest rate, r
dep
j is the deposit-interest rate and r
ser
j
is the service-fee rate. Then bank ai’s bank-level profit can be summed up market-level
revenue Raimt. Bank revenue after merger between target bank ti can be estimated by
match-specific attributes.
Π(ai, ti|E) = α0 + α1Wai + Fm(ai, ti) + ξai , (1.22)
F (ai, ti|E) = βWaiWti + ξCovariates(ai, ti)
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+ ω1Mktcompetition(ai, ti|E) + ω2Rival(ai, ti|E) + ai,ti .
Table 9 presents the results of regressing bank-level profit on merging bank and target bank’
attributes and match specific covariates and market externalities. But, it’s hard to extract
the match synergy value Fm(ai, ti) from bank profit. The coefficient on the interactive
assets is positive and significant. And the coefficients of cost and risk interaction terms are
negative. I can see the market externalities affected negatively and significantly revenue of
merging bank. However, I cannot draw strong inferences from this reduced form analysis.
For example, I cannot conclude yet that there’s substitutability between cost and risk
interaction terms.
To draw match-specific synergy effects, I estimate first difference log revenue estimation.
Table 9 reports the estimation results for the following specification.
∆log(Rai,ti) = β0 + βWaiWti + γ1Xai + γ2Xti + ξCovariates(ai, ti)
+ ω1Mktcompetition(ai, ti|E) + ω2Rival(ai, ti|E) + ξai,ti .
Compared to Table 8, the coefficients on the relevant interaction terms are positive. But, I
can not extract the effects of market externalities with log difference estimation.
1.5.3 Hypotheses
In section 6, I will test several hypotheses presented here regarding the matching between
bank mergers.
Hypothesis 1.5.1. Large banks tend to merge with large banks and small banks tend to
merge with small banks.
I include bank size as measured by the natural logarithm of the banks total assets and
number of branches. This pattern is called positive assortative mathching of sizes. To test
for positive assortative matching, two OLS regressions are run and column (1) and (2) in
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Table 8 show this pattern. The main reasons for positive assortative matching are as follows.
First, considerable consolidations were observed after 1994 Riegel-Neal Act. Consumers
prefer big banks with high branch networks. Expanding branch networks is a key motives
to induce mergers. Also, large and small banks typically use different criteria in service and
bank products. Therefore, large target banks are better match for large merging banks,
whereas small target banks are better match for small merging banks.
Hypothesis 1.5.2. The more overlapped are markets that merging and target banks serve
before merger, the higher post-merger value will have the merging bank. And this market
overlap match-specific covariates play an important role in matching.
From the prior studies, it is likely that the potential for cost efficiency and market power
depends on the geographic overlap of markets between the merging and target banks. The
market overlap between mergers indicates that the proportion of in-market bank mergers is
higher. In section 3.3, it is explained that in-market mergers have much more potential
than out-of market mergers for exercising market power and creating cost efficiency gains.
Hypothesis 1.5.3. The operating cost measure of target banks is complementary to the
merging bank’s cost efficiency.
Operating cost measure is defined in section 3.2.1. Following the regression of merging
bank’s cost attributes on matched target attributes in Table 8, I find cost measures are
positively related each other in matching. Dick (2006) regressed the effect of branching
deregulation on cost measure and shows that this cost measure appears to increase by
one percentage point following deregulation. Banks provide better service through more
extensive branching and ATM networks as well as paying higher salaries to their employees.
Throughout the mergers, increased geographic network enables banks to exploit high service
to customers.
Hypothesis 1.5.4. The proxies for risk of target banks is complementary to the merging
bank’s risk proxies.
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This hypothesis is consistent with regression between merging and target attributes in
column (4) in Table 8. Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) show that merger value depend
on operational performance for efficiency reasons. But, Dick (2006) shows that credit
risk appears to increase by o.4 percentage point following deregulation. Thus nationwide
branching can enhance banks to control credit risk only through geographic diversification.
Hypothesis 1.5.5. Market competition that each bank faces gives negative externalities on
match value.
Measures of market competition are studied in section 3.2.2. There has been several
attempts to revel the relationship between market concentration and prices after merger(
Sapienza 2002, Erel 2011). Thus, deposit interest rate is lower and loan interest rate is
higher in high concentrated markets. I find that post-merger revenue is lower in highly
competitive markets from Table 9.
Hypothesis 1.5.6. Rival banks’ merger activities as externalities affect match value.
There has been several papers to study rivals’ reactions following mergers. Kim and
Singal (1993), Hannan and Prager(1998) show that merging banks do not pass efficiency gain
to customers so merging banks lower deposit interest rate after merger. And non-merging
banks sharing same overlapping markets lowered deposit rates,too. Prior research shows
that rival banks behave similarly to consolidated banks. Also, rivals increase price when
the size of the merger is large. Thus, it is natural to expect that post-match value depends
on the size of merger activities of rival banks.
1.6 Estimation Results
1.6.1 Results from matching model
In the estimation, I include the following the interaction terms as explanatory variables for
the two-sided matching: Assets, number of branches, loan loss provision and operating cost
measures. Market overlap between matches are used for match-specific covariates.
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Since matching estimations are conducted without transfer data, I need to normalize
the match value. Based on the evidence that I described above for the positive assortative
matching of size, I use BranchMer× BranchTar as the normalized variable. I estimate first
fixing the coefficient at +1 and then fixing it at -1. The final estimates for all parameters
correspond to the sign of the coefficient of BranchMer× BranchTar with the highest objective
function value. The estimate of this normalized variable is super-consistent.
Table 11 shows that match value estimation results when only matched cases are included.
The coefficients on the interactions between merging and target assets and branches are
positive and statistically significant. It suggests that larger merging bank tends to merge
with larger target banks. This result is consistent with the conventional understanding that
most mergers were motivated by expanding branch networks and confirms hypothesis 5.1.
The coefficient of merger geographical overlap term is positive and significant in terms
of 95% confidence interval. It indicates that a match value is higher when a match occurs
between highly market-overlapped banks. An implication of this finding is that the potential
for cost saving and market power depends on the geographical overlap of markets between
merging and target banks. As the number of branches of merging banks that completely
overlapped with target banks increases, market overlap contributes the value of post-match
I also allow the match synergy function to depend on cost and risk measures. The
coefficient of cost measures is positive and significant, indicating that merging banks with
higher quality prefer to match with partners with relatively good service quality. This
supports hypothesis 5.3. Another possible reason is that rigidity of labor market.
However, the interaction term on risk measures turn out to be insignificant. In other
words, the risk measures doesn’t seem to be contributed on merger value. One possible
explanation is that banks might have used their greater geographic diversification as a
hedge against risk. Since nationwide branching through mergers and acquisitions allowed
banks to have different risk preferences, the interaction between merging and target banks’
loan loss provision measures is not a significant factor in the matching.
Finally, I incorporate market externalities into a matching model. Market competition
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and rival banks’ merger activities give significant and negative impacts on merging banks.
It is consistent with ceteris paribus, a bank’s profit increases with the number of its own
branches, and decreases with the number of competing rivals. When banks are exposed to
merger activities of rivals in the same markets, then gains from increased cost efficiency can
be minimized and it is hard for banks to exercise market power. I can infer that increased
competitive rivals can lessen the post-match values.
In Table 12, I expand analysis to unmatched banks. In this case, each bank can choose
whether to merge or stay unmatched. I show that results have similar sign with Table 11.
However, the impacts of rivals on un-matched banks’ merger are different from merging
banks. Multiple merger activities in the same markets will rather enhance competition.
Thus the coefficient of rivals merger activities on unmatched is positive. But, these effects
are relatively weaker.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I identify the key sources of match-specific characteristics to determine post-
merger synergy values in a competitive assignment framework. I investigates a two-sided
matching model in the banking merger market using U.S Texas branch location data from
1994-2005. Match synergy is determined by observable attributes of merging banks (active)
and target banks (passive) and match-specific covariates. The results show that bank size
and cost measures have positive assortative matching: Larger banks prefer to match with
large target banks, and banks with high cost quality tend to match with banks with high
cost to asset ratio. Moreover, I find the evidence of match-specific covariates such as market
overlap between matches play important roles in determining the match value.
Since the match synergy depends not only on the match between merging and target
banks but also on the activities of other banks in the market, I extend matching model
with externalities. Market competition and rival banks’ merger activities are regarded as
externalities. These externalities depend on all the banks in assignment and are additively
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separable, so the maximum score estimator is applicable. I find that effects of externalities
are not negligible. I show that banks have lower match values in competitive markets.
Also merger activities of rival banks weaken the merger effects of merging banks. However
merger activities of rival banks that exert market power give positive effects on un-matched
banks.
Even though I opened up potential to apply externalities on matching model, there are
many issues left for a future research regarding bank mergers and a matching model. One
issue I could not address was about dynamic market competition. Also, the model used in
this paper assumes one-to-one matching. An interesting extension of my model would be
applying one-to-many matching. Another set of extensions to this work should consider
unobservable incentives into matching model. Future research in this direction will likely
prove fruitful22.
22Bajari, Fox and Ryan (2006) and Fox and Yang (2012) studied the identification of the distribution of
unobserved complementaries in matching games.
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Table 1.3: Number of Banking Institutions of Entering, Exiting, Expanding and Shrinking
Behaviors in Texas Between 1995 and 2011
Number of Banks
Year
Exiting Entering Expanding Shrinking Merging Entry by Merger Total
1995 42 2 64 11 29 0 1021
1996 72 5 84 13 48 0 954
1997 57 14 69 7 27 1 911
1998 50 18 68 13 30 1 879
1999 63 20 67 10 32 6 836
2000 42 10 61 9 29 2 804
2001 54 16 56 10 36 8 766
2002 25 10 58 13 18 1 751
2003 23 13 32 11 16 2 741
2004 28 15 67 15 19 4 728
2005 26 19 65 4 19 4 721
2006 33 13 67 13 26 5 701
2007 24 27 70 13 19 3 704
2008 23 20 71 9 17 3 701
2009 21 11 56 8 15 3 691
2010 21 6 42 10 15 3 676
2011 28 10 33 15 15 6 658
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Table 1.6: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean St.Dev Min Max Obs.
Panel A: Active Banks in Mergers
Assets($ million) 1.11e+03 5.42e+03 1.68 6.55e+04 289
N of branches 21.86 53.77 0 451 289
Loan loss provision(%) 1.50 1.20 .22 14.72 289
ROA 1.22 .71 -4.34 4.15 289
Net-charge off rate(%) .12 .62 -2.24 8.88 289
Cost measure 1.73 .6 .09 6.90 289
Employees per branch 22.90 13.87 6 123.01 289
Rival merger activity .32 .32 0 1 289
Panel B: Target Banks in Mergers
Assets($ million) 301.4 2.43E+03 .69 3.23E+04 289
N of branches 14.56 52.89 1 487 289
Loan loss provision(%) 1.67 1.27 .29 13.57 289
ROA .91 1.29 -12.65 3.75 289
Net-charge off rate .44 1.66 -1.47 22.39 289
Cost measure 1.91 .74 .31 9.75 289
Employees per branch 17.23 9.53 0 92 289
Panel C: Unmatched Banks
Assets($ million) 124.63 492.17 1.20 5.90E+03 936
N of branches 11.19 21.63 1 226 936
Loan loss provision(%) 1.33 .55 .19 5.25 936
ROA 1.22 .97 -4.31 9.51 936
Net-charge off rate(%) .25 .61 -4.32 10.81 936
Cost measure 1.90 .67 .04 8.25 936
Employees per branch 18.63 12.37 2.67 156.77 936
Rival merger activity .61 .28 0 1 936
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Table 1.7: Multinomial Logit Regression
Merging Banks
(1) (2)
Explanatory Variables (vs. Target) (vs. Unmached Banks)
log(Asset) .26(.15)∗ .38(.06)∗∗∗
log(Branch) .32(.24) −.53(.11)∗∗∗
N of Counties −.02(.01) .04(.01)∗∗∗
Empbranch .59(.23)∗∗∗ .80(.17)∗∗∗
Loan loss provision 2.67(4.99) 37.01(9.77)∗∗∗
ROA(%) .18(.10)∗∗ −.08(.08)
Net Charge-Off Rate(%) −.23(.14)∗ −.24(.14)∗
Observations 1512
Pseudo R-squared .21
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 1.8: Regression of Target Characteristics on Merging Bank Characteristics
Characteristics of Merging Banks
Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
of Target Banks
log(Asset)Mer BranchMer CostMer RiskMer EmpbranchMer
log(Asset)Tar .88(.07)
∗∗∗ .11(.03)∗∗∗ −.04(.02)∗ .03(.04) .05(.04)
BranchTar .36(.20)
∗ .24(.09)∗∗∗ .02(.05) −.14(.11) .05(.07)
Costtar .41(.35) .14(.11) .14(.08)
∗ -.01(.20) −.17(.10)∗
RiskTar −.23(.16) −.04(.07) .03(.04) .21(.06)∗∗∗ −.04(.06)
EmpbranchTar .14(.19) .22(.08)
∗∗∗ −.04(.08) −.06(.14) .15(.08)∗
Fixed Effects Year Year Year Year Year
Observations 289 289 289 289 289
R-squared 0.55 0.24 0.08 0.10 0.09
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses next to each coefficient.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Cost measure is a variable that the natural logarithm of the ratio, non-interest expenses to asset.
Risk measure is a variable that loan loss provision ratio.
Empbranch is a variable that number of employees per branch. Empbranch and cost measure are in logs.
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Table 1.9: OLS Analysis of Bank Profit Function: Match Cases Only
Profit
Variables
(1) (2) (3)
logAssetmer −.71(.40)∗ −.78(.40)∗
Branchmer .38(.30) .38(.30)
Costmer .47(.27)
∗ .41(.26)
Riskmer −2.43(1.30)∗ −1.67(1.21)
logAssetmer× logAssettar .07(.01)∗∗∗ .10(.02)∗∗∗ .10(.02)∗∗∗
Branchmer× Branchtar .24(.30) .12(.14) .13(.14)
Costmer× Costtar −.10(.04)∗∗∗ .40(.26) .35(.26)
Risktar× Riskmer −.16(.04)∗∗∗ −.18(.05)∗∗∗ −.18(05)∗∗∗
Merger Overlap .10(.01)∗∗∗ .11(.04)∗∗∗ .13(.02)∗∗∗
Market Competition −.78(.31)∗∗ −.62(.21)∗∗∗
Rival’s Merger activities .67(.60) −.81(.43)∗
Observations 289 289 289
R-squared 0.65 0.70 0.69
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.10: OLS Analysis of Bank ∆Profit Function: Match Cases Only
∆t log(profit)
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
logAssetmer −.291(.06)∗∗∗ .062( .12)
Branchmer −.172(.06)∗∗∗ −.205(.07)∗∗∗
Costmer −1.53(.53)∗∗∗ −.299(.48)
Riskmer −.264(.10)∗∗∗ −25.69(3.11)∗∗∗
logAssettar .481(.05)
∗∗∗ .394(.15)∗∗
Branchtar .312(.12)
∗∗∗ .169(.12)
Costtar .151(.10) .133(.09)
Risktar .325(.11)
∗∗∗ −6.39(3.23)∗∗
logAssettar× logAssetmer .016(.01)∗∗∗ .015(.01)∗∗∗ −.007(.01) .030(.01)∗
Branchtar×Branchmer .005(.01) −.064(.01)∗∗∗ .088(.02)∗∗∗ −.014(.02)
Costtar× Costmer −.10(.05)∗ .057(.01)∗∗∗ .084(.02)∗∗∗ .152(.07)∗∗
Risktar× Riskmer −.009(.01) .06(.01)∗∗∗ −.020(.01) −.036(.02)
Merger Overlap .15(.11) .08(.12) .201(.09)∗∗ .114(.12)
Market Competition −.075(.04)∗ −.05(.05) .058(.12) −.108(.15)
Rival’s merger activity .100(.12) .112(.13) −.097(.12)
Observations 289 289 289 289
R-squared 0.62 0.54 0.37 0.66
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.12: Maximum Score Estimates of Match Value Function
Match Function Estimates
Explanatory Variables Point Estimate 95% Confidence Interval
Branchtar× Branchmer 1 superconsistent
logAssettar× logAssetmer 1.22 (0.009, 1.77)
logCosttar× log Costmer 0.58 (-0.76, 1.02)
Merger Overlap 5.19 ( 0.24, 8.71)
Rival’s merger activity; Unmatched 4.08 (−0.25, 13.70)
Rival’s merger activity ; Match −7.24 (−12.83,−1.25)
Market Competition −0.20 (−0.36,−0.04)
Observations 1225
N of Inequalities 23417
Percent of Inequality 0.88
I run the differential evolution(DE) algorithm in Mathmatica.
95% confidence intervals are reported in parentheses below each coefficient.
For confidence intervals, I follow the subsampling procedure described in Politis, Romano, and Wolf (1999)
and use subsampe size equal to 1/4 of the total sample size.
Chapter 2
Merger Simulations in Retail Bank Networks:
Evidence from Geographical Expansion after the
Riegel-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act
2.1 Introduction
United States antitrust laws forbid mergers that would harm consumer welfare. The United
States congress passed the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Acts of 1976 (HSR)
that requires Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) must be approved by government.1 In
banking industry, FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Cooperation) has determined that the
transaction would not result in a monopoly or further any combination or conspiracy to
monopolize or to attempt to monopolize the business of banking in any part of the United
States ,and that the transaction would not have the effect in any section of the country to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly or in any other manner to
restrict competition2.
In order to make a policy decision regarding merger simulation, researchers have interests
to forecast post-merger prices and merger simulations. Given a large number of mergers,
there exist a considerable literature regarding merger simulations in various industry. It
1Following the passage of the HSR Act in 1976, all mergers valued at more than $15 million are required
to file with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice.
2Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Merger Decisions Annual Report To Congress. Additional
reports are available at the FDIC’s Public Information Center’s website.
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includes ready-to eat cereals (Nevo, 2000), carbonated soft drinks (Dube, 2000), airline
(Peter, 2006), car motor oil, breakfast syrup (Weinberg and Hosken, 2013), and beer
(Hausman an Leonard, 2002).
The U.S. banking industry after mid 1990s offers a good environment to evaluate the
post-merger simulation. First, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency
Act of 1994 (IBBEA), which permitted nationwide branching as of June 1997 brought a
structural and regulatory change in banking industry. After these regulations lifted, there
has been a considerable consolidation in banking industry. The total number of banking
institutions declined by half from 10453 in 1994 to 5876 as of June 30, 2013 in U.S. Also a
rich dataset of prices and services offered is publicly available to study merger simulation
methodology.
Recently, Agarwal et al (2012) suggest that inconsistent regulators impose significant
implict costs on banks through regulations. Therefore, these friction hamper the effectiveness
of regulations. The fact that banks with national charters are subject to different regulatory
procedures than banks with state charters increase the cost of mergers between banks of
different charter types3.
Despite increasing interests in post-merger price changes, the traditional merger simula-
tion methodology cannot provide an accurate forecast of price. This paper simulates and
estimates the changes of price and firm conducts. Because it relies on strong assumptions
on the post-merger behavior of demand, costs and firm conducts. While prices are included
as choice variables in merger simulation, there is no mechanism that allows product charac-
teristics to be adjusted after a merger. Peters (2006) points out that this prediction error on
price can come from the post-merger changes in supply and suggests incorporating flexible
models of firm conducts.
After the RN act, the number of banks has shrunk and the number of branches has
grown. Banks have expanded their branch networks through M&As. To study the effects of
3To quantify the implicit costs of bank chartering through frictions in the bank merger market, Akkus et
al (2013) allows the merger value function to depend on whether the acquirer and target have the same type
of charter and regulated by the same regulator.
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consolidation, it is important to know why banks want to merge. A bank can enter new
markets for economies of scale and cost efficiency. On the other hand, a bank might enter
to acquire market power through obtaining new branches in the same market. The net
effect of mergers depends on whether the market power or efficiency effect dominates. One
important condition that determines an increase in the market power of the acquiring bank
is whether it operates in the same markets as the target bank. This implies that branch
networks play an important role in bank merger analysis. I find that the post-merger change
in cost is not only from cost efficiency as a merger synergy effect, but also from changes
in product quality represented by branch networks. In this paper, I explicitly consider
branch networks as a choice variable in merger simulations, which is useful to improve the
performance of merger simulations.
To analyze bank mergers empirically, I construct a data set that covers commercial
banks in Texas from 1994 to 2005. I apply the methodology of Peters (2006) incorporating
post-merger changes in product quality to reduce the discrepancy between pre-merger price
and post-merger price.
Merger simulation consists of three process: 1) Estimation of consumer demand using
pre-merger data; 2) Recovery of pre-merger marginal costs under some assumption about
firm conducts; 3) Prediction of post-merger prices.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a related literature review.
Section 3 provides preliminary evidence and background in U.S banking industry to motivate
this paper’s topic, as well as introducing data I use and evidence. In section 4, structural
demand and supply models are presented. Section 5 shows the estimation results. Section 6
provides post-merger changes on merging banks and rival banks after mergers occurred and
merger simulation results, and section 7 concludes.
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2.2 Related literature
Mergers and Acquisitions in banking industry have been a popular research topic in
economics and finance. Interestingly, the research has expanded to various directions.
Some literature deal with bank mergers in terms of price change. Most papers focus on
the ex-post price and performance change of the consolidated banks and rivals. Focarelli
and Panetta (2003) investigate the pricing effects of M&As in Italian banks and find that
short-run effects generate negative price changes to consumers while efficiency gains through
mergers lead to favorable price change in the long run. Both Sapienza (2002) and Erel (2011)
analyze the effects of mergers on loan spread, but they obtain different results. Sapienza
(2002) finds that horizontal mergers with small targets resulted in lower loan rate in Italy.
Banks, however, reduce lending to small borrowers after mergers. On the other hand, Erel
(2011) reports that the reduction in loan spreads is significant only for small loans, and
finds that larger acquirer does not drop small business lending of smaller targets. Moreover,
he points out that in-market and out-of-market mergers have different effects on market
structure and efficiency.
Another strand of the literature about rivals’ reactions after mergers includes the
following. Kim and Singal (1993) and Hannan and Praeger (1998) show that merging
banks do not pass efficiency gain to customers, so merging banks lower deposit interest
rate after merger. Non-merging banks that share the same overlapping markets also lower
deposit rates. Kahn et al. (2002) examine systematic tendency between acquirors, targets
and un-exposed (unmatched) banks. Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) consider the extent of
competition between banks. They endogenize the operating decisions of three types of
depository institutions and analyze how the competitive effect influences market structure
across bank types in rural areas.
The literature on anti-trust analysis includes the following. Hausaman and Leonard
(1994), Nevo (2000) and Werden and Froeb (1994) apply merger simulation methods to
analyze the price effect. Nevo (2000) estimates the demand of breakfast cereal using Berry,
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Levinsohn and Pakes’ (1995) (henceforth, BLP) method and simulates the price effect of
mergers in breakfast cereal markets. Peters (2006) and Weinberg and Hosken (2008) find
that the traditional simulation methods fail to provide an accurate price prediction. Peters
(2006) studies merger simulations in the airline industry. He analyzes the discrepancy
between the simulated and actual price changes and attributes a substantial portion of the
post-merger price effect to observed changes such as entry/exit, flight frequency, airport
presence as well as unobserved post-merger changes in demand and costs. Molnar (2008) is
close to this paper. He applies merger simulations to the retail Finland banking sector and
estimates marginal cost from accounting data.
Lastly, this paper relates to the studies on structural models to analyze consumer and
bank behaviors. I estimate demand and cost functions separately using the instrumental
regression developed by BLP (1995) and Nevo (2001). Dick (2008) is the first paper
to estimate a nested logit demand model in banking industry. She estimates a discrete
consumer choice model, specifically emphasizing the distinction between single-market
banks and multi-market banks. It is worth noting that she focuses on deposit services of
commercial banking sector.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Evidence
2.3.1 Data
I focus on the period of massive consolidation that occurred following the Riegle-Neal Act
of 1994. The dataset used in this paper is a panel of banking institutions between 1994 and
2005 and include commercial banks and their mergers in Texas state, U.S. To compile the
dataset, I use three different sources. First, information on bank ownership and deposits can
be obtained from Summary of Deposits (SOD) as of June 30th of each year at the Federal
Deposit Insurance Cooperation (FDIC). This provides information, for example, deposits
by branch, addresses of branches for every bank and thrift, the location of headquarter,
whether a bank belongs to a bank holding company, and whether a bank was a former
54
savings associations. The dataset contains only the FDIC insured banks that had at least
one branch while saving associations are excluded.4 Since boundaries of counties have been
relatively static and each bank shows different behaviors in urban and rural counties, I
define a county as a geographic unit for my analysis. According to Amel et al. (2008),
the market for checking, savings has remained local, with the median distance between a
consumer and financial service provider being under 4 miles. Texas state has 254 counties.
Furthermore, I consider branches as brick and mortar offices with full service. I do not
include branches with limited service such as drive-through facilities, consumer credit offices,
and branches for home banking.5
The data on mergers are obtained from the history of each commercial bank provided by
the FDIC. The National Information Center (NIC) and FDIC have recorded the history of
all depository institutions that ever existed in the United States. This information includes
mergers, acquisitions and bankruptcy, and allows me to identify all merger cases and to define
which banks are active or passive. When a merger between banks occurs, the certificate
number of passive (target) bank disappears and becomes part of an existing (merging)
bank. I distinguish mergers from acquisitions because they have different motivations.
Mergers that involve a full integration of bidder and target banks can be counted for this
analysis. When previously independent bidder and target banks merge, target banks lose
their charters after merger and become part of bidder banks and have the same balance
sheet with an unified branch network. Thus, combined balance sheets and unified branch
networks are recorded under the certificate number of the active bank. Though the bank
can change its name after the merger, the certificate number is invariable. To construct
bank mergers, I exclude bank failures and mergers with assistance cases.6
4Saving associations have different strategies and products from commercial banks.
5Each branch in the SOD data has a unique number and the type of service provided by each office is
identifiable. As on-line banking becomes popular since early 2000s, on-line banking deposits have increased
significantly. Note that the percentage of brick and mortar offices has decreased to 89 % in 2005 from
97 % in 1994. Offices with deposits above 1 billion dollars are also excluded from the analysis. Deposits
from internet banking are counted under specific home-banking branches, but these offices never deal with
individual customers in local markets. These branches might disrupt the analysis of banking markets.
6A failing institution is absorbed into an acquiring institution that receives the FDIC assistance. Assisted
mergers were the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation’s preferred resolution method. Therefore,
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Finally, I use additional bank-level data regarding balance sheets and income statements
from the Report on Condition and Income (known as Call Reports) and Thrift Financial
Reports in June from the Federal Reserve Board. Call Reports contain information on
assets, interest expenses on deposits, total employees and non-interest expenses including
wages and premises. Some bank performance related indexes are also contained: ROA, net
charge-off rates and loan loss provision. Each bank must maintain an allowance (reserve)
for loan and lease losses that is adequate to absorb estimated credit losses associated with
its loan and lease portfolio. Thus, net loans are defined as total loans minus unearned
income and loan loss allowances (provisions). All financial data are on an individual bank
basis. I compute the bank-level deposit interest rate as the ratio of interest-expenses to
total domestic deposits. Service fees are calculated as the ratio of service charges on deposit
accounts to total deposits. I use Call Reports from the end of June to compute these
rates, so they can be interpreted as 6 month rates. Because the rates are calculated at the
bank level, they do not vary across markets. Hannan and Prager (2004), Heitfield (1999),
however, suggest that banks set rates to be uniform across geographic areas. I also use the
total number of branches and employees to calculate the number of employees per branch.
I define dummy variables for multi-market banks, single-market banks. ”single-market
bank” is set to 1 if over 80% of its deposits were received from branches in a single county.
This definition is consistent with Cohen and Mazzeo (2007). Demographic data at the
county level are taken from the US Census 2000 and Bureau of Economics Analysis. This
provides median household income and total population for each county in Texas.
2.3.2 Descriptive Evidence
Figure 1 presents the number of banking institutes in the United States from 1960 to 2013.
If we focus on the period from 1990 to 2005, we can find explicit trends from both panels
in figure 1. On the left-hand panel, the number of banking institutions has dropped since
1990s. This trend began in the mid 1980s and has continued to the present. This decline of
the acquiring institution is not responsible for unpaid assessments of the failed institution.
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the numbers of banking institutions come from the merger and acquisitions. Park (2014)
finds that most of bank exits have taken place through mergers and presents that the
number of bank mergers is peaked around 1997 when the RN Act became effective and
decreases steadily until 1999. The total number of banking institutions declined by half
from 10453 in 1994 to 5876 as of June 30, 2013 in the U.S. In contrast, at the same time,
the size of existing banks has been increased steadily. The right-hand panel in figure 1
shows that the number of branches has grown. Specifically, the number of branches in Texas
has increased considerably after the late 1980s. The number of total bank branches were
roughly doubled over the twenty years and had grown to 82554 branches in 2010. Since the
number of banking institutions has decreased during the same time period, we can expect
that each bank institution might expand branch networks.
The U.S. banking Industry has experienced a regulatory and structural change after the
RN Act in 1994. The RN Act includes both interstate and intrastate de-regulations. This
federal law allows banks to expand their branch networks through merger and acquisition
or de-novo branching.7 It means that a bank must acquire another bank and merge the
two structures in order to operate branches across state lines. It seems very interesting
that most of entries are made by mergers and most of exits are absorbed by existing banks
although the RN Act enables bank institutions to do interstate and intrastate de-novo
branching. Before 1990s, U.S. banking industry was highly fragmented. Most of banks
tended to concentrate their banking activities in some specific geographic areas. After these
regulations lifted, many banks extended their branch networks across market lines. Figure 2
shows the percentage of bank institutions whose branches are operating in multiple markets,
i.e., counties in Texas. The percentage of banks operating in multiple counties grow from
22% in 1995, to almost 50% in 2005. The percentage of banks with branches in multiple
states grew below from 2% in 1995 to 7.3% to 2010. This multi-state banks control the
majority of the deposits in each local market
7While twenty-five states adopted interstate branching by merger and acquisition as of 1997, only thirteen
states allowed interstate de-novo branching. By the end of 2005, twenty two states plus the District of
Columbia permitted de-novo branching
57
2.4 Models
I consider a structural model of demand and supply of retail deposit services separately.
I think of retail banks as service providers that are differentiated in terms of observed
and unobserved characteristics such as observed interest rates, service fee rates, number
of branch networks versus unobserved brand name values and advertising. The demand
estimation follows Dick (2008) equipped with a discrete choice approach proposed by BLP
(1995). I use the estimated price elasticities from the demand estimates to calculate marginal
costs.
2.4.1 Consumer Demand Estimation for Deposit Services
Although banks offer a variety of products and services, research on deposit service has
been studied prevalent in the literature. My analysis concentrates on banks’ deposit rates.
To investigate the effects of bank mergers, I first estimate demands. Demands for different
banking services can be derived from individuals’ utility maximization and estimated with
characteristics based on the discrete choice model. Consumers maximize their utilities based
on their own preference and the products available on the markets. The standard approach
on merger simulation with differentiated products is to assume static Nash Bertrand conduct:
firms choose prices non-cooperatively to maximize a short-run profit function. Total bank
deposits are the sum of the deposits over all the branches, which can be collected from
branches in different local markets ,i.e., counties.
2.4.1.1 Utility Function
It is assumed that a consumer chooses a single commercial bank for depository services.
I treat each bank as a single product firm offering a basket of services. I assume that
m = 1, . . . ,M markets are observed, each with i = 1, . . . , Im consumers and j = 1, . . . , Jm
banks. The conditional indirect utility function of consumer i for choosing bank j’s deposit
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services in market m (county-year) takes the following form:
Uijmt = δjm + ijm = −pjmαim + xjmβim + ξjm + ijm (2.1)
where pjm is bank j’s price as defined below, xjm is a K-dimensional (row) vector of observ-
able institution characteristics, unobservable (by the econometricians) bank characteristics
ξjm, and an individual-bank unobservable term ijm. An error term is assumed to be
independently distributed across consumers and banks according to the type 1 extreme
value distribution. The variables included in observable characteristics are the number of
branches, the number of employees per branch, the asset size of bank, and the number
of branches of rival banks in the same market. The number of branches in the market is
used to proxy how easy it is for consumers to access bank services. Also, the number of
employees per branch captures waiting time that can be shorter when banks employ more
workers.
The equation (2.1) can be estimated by treating the unobserved product quality ξjm as an
unobserved error term. The bank specific unobservable ξjm accounts for the various aspects
of bank quality. These unobserved charateristics can be correlated with the endogenous
characteristics and make the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator biased. Hence, I use
instrumental variables (IVs) with fixed effects to deal with the price endogeneity.
The utility of an outside option, that is, savings association, is given as
Ui0m = ξ0m + i0m
where ξ0m is normalized to be 0. I define price −pjm is the average net deposit interest rate
(the average deposit interest rate minus the average service rate).8 These assumptions lead
to the logit demand model shown by Berry (1994).
It is useful to consider a situation in which consumers have homogeneous levels of
deposits and homogeneous preferences for price and product quality. Heterogeneity in
8See Molnar et al. (2013).
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consumers’ preferences can be applied to the utility function only through ijm. The logit
model is specified as
ln(sjm)− ln(s0m) = −pjmαim + xjmβim + ξj + ijm. (2.2)
The logit model has a shortcoming of generating potentially unrealistic substitution
patterns. The logit model restricts consumers to substitute towards other brands in
proportion to market shares regardless of the characteristics. Moreover, if the share of
the outside good is too large, the logit model makes substitution to inside goods biased
downwards. However, the full model allows for flexible own-price elasticities and the random
shock is no longer independent of product characteristics. Thus, the cross-price substitution
patterns can be influenced by these characteristics.
The nested logit model is more flexible than the logit, as it allows for interactions between
product and consumer characteristics. I divide banks into two groups: ”multi-market banks”
and ”single-market banks” Given such grouping, the nested logit model has a expression
ln(sjm)− ln(s0m) = pjmα+xjmβim + σ ln(s¯jm/g) + ξj (2.3)
where ln(s¯jmt/g) represents the market share of bank j in market m at time t, which belongs
to group g, as a fraction of the total group share. (i.e. sjm/g=
sj∑Jm
j=1 sjm
) The within group
market share term is also endogenous together with the prices and instrumental variables
regression is necessary.
Consumers are assumed to choose one bank that gives them the highest utility. This
implicitly defines a set Aijm of unobserved variables that leads to the choice of bank j in
market m, that is,
Aijm = {uijm > uikm, ∀k = 0, 1, ..., Jm}. (2.4)
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2.4.1.2 Market Shares
Market share is defined as a ratio of total deposits of a bank to the total amount of deposits
collected in a particular geographic market. Since the distribution of individual deposits is
not observed in the data, I relate individual deposits to an observable variable, income Yim
as suggested by Ishii (2004) and Zhou (2008).
If  has distribution p∗ (.), then the probability that consumer i chooses bank j in market
m is
sjm =
∫
Aijm
dP ∗(D, v, ) =
∫
Aijm
dP ∗()dP ∗(v)dp∗(D).
The utility function along with homogeneous level of deposits, implies that shares of deposits
are equal to shares of consumers, hence can be simplified as follows:
sjm =
exp(−pjmα+ xjmβim + ξjm)
1 + ΣJml=1exp(−plmα+ xlmβim + ξlm)
. (2.5)
2.4.1.3 Price Elasticities
After I estimate demand parameters in the logit model, I can compute the elasticities. The
corresponding own elasticities of bank j in period t can be calculated according to the
following formula that is derived from equation (2.4). The price elasticities are
ηjkt =
∂sjt
∂pkt
pkt
sjt
=

−αpjt(1− sjt) if j = k,
αpksk otherwise.
(2.6)
2.4.1.4 Instruments
Unobserved bank characteristics ξj are likely to be correlated with prices. To estimate the
demand and deposit return rate, I need a set of instruments, z, which satisfies the following
condition:
E[ξj |z] = 0.
Following Berry (1994) and BLP (1995), I use bank exogenous characteristics and the
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sums of the values of the same characteristics of other banks as instruments. Cost shifters
provide another source of demand instruments. I use a series of cost shifters similar to Dick
(2008). I include variables related to four main components of marginal costs: expenses
on premises and equipment, other expenses including legal fees, a credit risk measured as
the ratio of non-performing loans to net loans, wages and the number of employees per
branch. Expenses are normalized by asset size. The first instrument variable is expenses on
premises and fixed assets which includes costs for maintenance, utilities, lease payments,
etc. The second instrument variable is the entry for other expenses which is another
measure of operating costs that includes expenses such as fees and taxes. I use the value of
non-performing loans as a proxy for the costs of credit risk.
2.4.2 Supply Model
I have shown that the RN Act brought a substantial expansion of branch networks in banking
industry. Branches compete for the supply of deposits from households and businesses in
the market. The equilibrium in this model relates the deposits and the profits of a bank
with the branch networks, ownership change and market characteristics. Specifically, banks
offer diverse products to consumers. Mainly, banks provide deposit services, which they
primarily generate revenue. This paper focuses on the deposit side of banking industry and
does not consider explicitly lending products.
Once I have estimated the parameters and cross-elasticities of the demand function, I
need to build an assumption about firm conduct changes after mergers to recover marginal
costs.
2.4.2.1 Recovery of Pre-merger Marginal Costs
Weinberg and Hosken (2008) find that shifts in demand after mergers cannot explain the
difference between the simulated and actual price changes and claim that only a small
part can be explained. Large marginal cost changes are required to equate actual and
simulated price effects. Branching costs are linear in the number of branches, therefore
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the marginal cost is constant.9 Zhou (2008) assumes that the cost function is convex and
dependent on branch density, so the marginal cost is the same for a bank across the markets.
Aguirregabiria et al. (2013) considers the cost function of the total amount of deposits of
bank i in market m and the number of branches in market m. Because the total variable
costs decline with the number of branches, marginal costs are decreasing function at branch
level. Molnar (2008) estimates marginal costs using a trans-log cost function.
Supply is modeled as a static Bertrand game. The bank’s choice problem is broken
down into two stages. In the first stage, a bank chooses its branch networks and cost of
implementing branches. In the second stage, a bank set the deposit interest rate and service
fee rate that maximizes profits. I impose several properties to the profit function. First, a
bank profit function is increasing with market size. Second, it is decreasing with the overall
number of branches in the market. As the market becomes crowded with branches, a bank
profit reduces. Third, it increases with own branches. A bank j’s profit in market m is
given by
pijm = (r
loan
jm − rdepjm + rserjm )Mmsjm − Cj(Djm, njm) (2.7)
where Mm is market-size, total deposits from market m, sjm is the market-share of bank j
in market m, rloanj is the loan-interest rate, r
dep
j is the deposit-interest rate, and r
ser
j is the
service-fee rate. The profit function consists of the revenue from the deposit markets minus
the non-interest cost (Cj). I assume that non-interest cost is a function of branch networks
njmt and total deposits of bank j collected in market m. Thus, market share sjm can be
calculated from sjm =
Djm
Mm
.
The optimal branching size can be achieved when its marginal benefits are equal to its
marginal costs of branching. Then the variable profit function of bank j in market m can
be rewritten as
V pjm = (r
loan
jt − pj −mcj)Mmsjm. (2.8)
9Cerasi et al. (2011)
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The optimal prices pj must satisfy the first order conditions (FOCs):
(rloanjm − pj −mcj) =
∑M
m=1Mmsj∑M
m=1Mm
∂sjm
∂pj
. (2.9)
Since price and market share are observed in the data, the derivatives of the demand
function can be computed from the estimated demand parameters. For a market with
N products, this yields N linear equations, which can be solved for deposit return rate,
rjm = r
loan
jm −mcj :
rjm = −pj − (4p)−1s (2.10)
where Ms is a J × 1 matrix, 4pis a J × J matrix with 4pjk = ∂skm∂pjm . I define
∂skm
∂pjm
= 0 if
neither bank j nor k presents on market m.
2.4.2.2 Deposit Return Rate
The deposit return rate summarizes the non-interest marginal cost and the loan interest
rates that a specific bank can earn on the deposits. Figure 3 shows how yearly average
price and yearly average federal funds rate vary across years. Average price(explicit) and
average federal funds rate move on the opposite directions. Average federal funds rate has
a bigger fluctuation than average price. The real price is the difference between putting
money in a bank account and paying back debts. Radecki (1999) suggests using the federal
funds rate as an approximation of foregone income for deposit balances, but the federal
funds rate is not directly connected to consumers.Thus I estimate deposit return10 rate
instead of average loan rate or federal funds rate.
Researchers have traditionally included product characteristics as determinants of
marginal costs or estimated a trans-log cost function on accounting data11. I follow the
first approach and specify the deposit return rate of bank j as a function of the observed
exogenous characteristics in which the number of markets(counties) and the number of
10Molnar et al (2013) name it
11Ishii (2004) assumes that the loan interest rate to be exogenous
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branches of rival banks in the same market are included.12
rjm = τXjm + ωjm. (2.11)
The deposit return rate is assumed to be the outcome of the optimal loan rate for a given
bank. Therefore, I exclude endogenous loan interest rates as regressors.
Given the Bertrand assumption, the first order conditions for each bank’s profit maxi-
mization help to derive marginal costs. Note that marginal costs are essentially computed as
a residual. Thus, the marginal cost represents the component of price that is not explained
by the estimated mark-up. As a result, it is reasonable to treat the post-merger behavior of
marginal costs as an unobserved product quality.
2.4.3 Estimation Procedure
Estimation of demand parameters relies on the instruments.
E[ξj |z] = E[ν|z] = 0.
The difficulty in calculating ξjm is that the equation for market share is not easily invertible.
To invert out the error term, I use the contraction mapping of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes
(1995) and Nevo (2002a, 2002b). Precisely, I use simulated market shares and perform the
BLP contraction mapping to recover ξjm. Given the assumptions on the error terms, ξjm
and ν can be calculated first, then I use the following moment conditions
G(θ) = E
[(
ξjm(θ)Z
D
jm
νjm(θ)ZSjm
)]
(2.12)
12Zhou(2008) includes the number of dominant banks, large banks and fringe banks. Calomiris and
Pornrojnangkool(2005) find that only mergers between dominant banks can cause an increase in loan rates.
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where G(θ0) = 0 with the true parameter θ0. If there are N bank observations in the
sample, the sample moment condition can be formed as follows:
GN (θ) =
1
N
N∑
jm
[(
ξjm(θ)Z
D
jm
νjm(θ)ZSjm
)]
. (2.13)
Then I search for θ that minimizes the function
GN (θ)
′
AGN (θ) (2.14)
where A is a weighting matrix.
2.5 Results
Table 1 reports the estimated logit demand functions with instruments. The first and
second columns show that the results of OLS regressions, while the third column is IV
regression. Both price and the number of branches in each market parameters are significant
and have the expected sign. The regression coefficients indicate that consumers prefer high
deposit rate and dislike high service fee rate. The estimate of branches is positive and
significant, but declining. Also, consumers prefer larger banks (high asset size) and high
quality bank (number of employees per branch). These results are consistent with Dick
(2008). The effect of the competition in the same market is negative and significant. The
demand estimation result shows that price, branch networks, and bank quality are the key
factors for consumers.
Table 2 reports results from estimating the OLS and IV nested logit model. The results
in terms of price sensitivity are similar to the logit results. Using the estimates from the
IV regression, I obtain price elasticities. The median own-price elasticity is negatives and
−1.36. Compared with th result in Dick (2008) where the median elasticity of service fee is
−0.44 and the median deposit rate elasticity is 2.99, this is slightly lower.
Table 4 reports the recovered deposit return rate. A constant term, exogenous bank
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characteristics, year dummies, and bank size dummies are included as regressors. Results
indicate that larger banks have significantly lower deposit returns. I attribute this result to
either higher marginal costs or lower loan interest rates. The coefficient on the number of
rival banks shows negative sign due to competitive effects.
2.6 Post-merger Evolution and Merger Simulations
I include post-merger changes in product quality in merger simulation.
2.6.1 The Impact of Merger Activities on Branch Networks
Branch networks after the mergers is not the sum of the number of pre-merger branches
between merging banks and target banks. The impact of mergers on branch networks
depends why banks want to merge. A bank can enter new markets for economies of scale and
cost efficiency. The other motive is to acquire market power through obtaining new branches
in the same market. The net effects of mergers depend on whether the market power or
efficiency effect dominates. One important condition that determines the increase to the
acquiring bank’s market power is whether it operates in the same markets as the target
bank. I define in-market merger in which branches of each bank serve in the same markets
before merger. When target and merging banks do not have any geographical overlap
and consolidated banks penetrate new markets through merger, it is called Out-of-Market
Mergers or market-expansion mergers. Two types of mergers are likely to produce different
effects on market structure, which in turn affect prices and products of merging banks and
rivals.
Previous literature about bank mergers shows that in-market mergers have much more
potential than out-of-market mergers for exercising market power and creating efficiency
gains. In-market mergers bring loss of competition since markets get concentrated after
mergers and consolidated banks obtain market power. On the other hand, in-market mergers
offer more opportunities for cost efficiency than out-of market mergers. That is, the least
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efficient branches can be eliminated via mergers. It is consistent with findings in this paper.
This is why I include market overlap measure in regression. The market overlap index
describes how many branches the merging bank has owned in the previous period, overlapped
with the branches of target banks. This measure of market overlap has a maximum value
of 1, when all branches exist in same markets (in-market mergers only) and a minimum
value of 0, when the buyer bank enters new markets (out-of-market mergers only).
Table 5 presents the post-merger changes in branch densities of merging banks. The
number of post-merger branches depends on overlapped markets between merging banks
and target banks. If merger happens in totally overlapped market, then the number of
post-merger branches are less than the sum of the number of pre-merger branches. Also If a
merging banks enter a new market, then a merging bank wants to increase branch densities
to obtain market power in a new market.
Column (2) in Table 5 shows that the merger effects of rival banks on a merging bank.
If some of rival banks in the same market are involved in merger activities at the same time,
then a merging bank increase the branch densities to compete with rival banks. This is
consistent with first chapter results that Competitive rivals lessen the effects of mergers
but mergers that increase market power have positive externalities on unmatched banks
through matching model in banking industry.
2.6.2 The Impact of Merger Activities of Rivals on Branch Networks
An ownership change can affect rival banks in the same market. Previous research suggests
that rivals’ reaction differs according to dominant effects of mergers. When market power
effect is dominant, the rivals adopt the so-called ”follower” strategy, changing prices
unfavorably to customers. On the other hand, if cost efficiency effect dominates, then rival
banks might be able to reduce prices to maintain their market share. When in-market
mergers occur, merging banks can consolidate less efficient branches. Consumers tend to
switch to better managed banks, which unmatched rival banks also would like to remove
less competitive branches and consolidate branches to provide better service to compete
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with consolidated banks. The effect of out-of-market mergers on rival banks is weaker than
that of in-market mergers.
Though characteristics and prices are available only on bank level, changes in the number
of branches are observable in market level. Branch density reflects both bank’s quality and
market mobility. It can be a good indicative for the merger effect of rivals on markets. The
number of branches owned by bank k in market h is estimated by the following equation:
Log(Branchk,h) = τ1Merge
t=0,−1,−2,−4
k,t + τ3Bankk,t
+ λ1Mkt
comp
k,t + λ2Rival
in
k,t + λ3Rival
out
k,t + dt + νkt
where Rivaloutk,t and Rival
in
k,t are dummy variables that take the value of 1 when out-of-market
and in-market mergers of rivals occur, respectively. Estimation results are presented in Table
6. I find that in-market merger and out-of-market merger affect rivals differently. When
in-market merger happens in the same market, merging banks have more opportunities
for saving cost. At first, the least efficient branches can be eliminated. Then rival banks
correspond by reducing inefficient branches to offer better service to consumers. On the
other hand, if new banks enter the market through out-of-market mergers, then competition
is enhanced and rival banks increase branch density to compete new banks.
I analyze the long-term change of mergers. Consolidated banks gradually increase branch
density to exert cost-efficiencies obtained by mergers. The effects of bank characteristics
and market structure are consistent with other analysis. In sum, larger and less risky banks
have higher branch density, and market competition gives a negative effect on the number
of branches.
2.6.3 Merger Simulations
Merger simulation consists of three processes: 1) Estimation of consumer demand using
pre-merger data; 2) Recovery of pre-merger marginal costs under some assumptions about
firm conducts; 3) Prediction of post-merger prices. In the traditional literature on merger
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simulation, the post-merger equilibrium is simulated by changing the profit functions
to account for the ownership change and solve the best response functions for the new
equilibrium prices, assuming demand estimates, costs and the nature of competition do
not change. However, I apply the methodology of Peters (2006) incorporating post-merger
changes in product quality to reduce the discrepancy between pre-merger price and post-
merger price. After the merger, banks consider the changes not only in ownership structure,
but also in post-merger branch networks and characteristics.
Out of 289 mergers that happens in Texas between 1995 and 2004, I select 75 merger
sample in simulation. Usually, the impact of within-market mergers on price, branch density
and market share is much larger than the impact of out-of-market mergers. Thus I exclude
out-of-market merger cases to see the difference between pre and post-merger changes. Also,
I exclude when target bank is fringe and single-market bank. Since I assume the merger
decision as exogenous in this paper, I do not include the expectation of any other mergers
in the merger simulations.
The process for the merger simulation is as follows:
Step 1: From the demand estimation using per-merger data, obtain price elasticities .
Step 2: Recover the deposit return rate from the first order conditions Equation (2.9) of
supply model.
Step 3: Calculate post-merger exogenous characteristics. The number of counties, bank
size and the number of employees per branch are included.
Step 4: Projection of the post-merger evolution of endogenous characteristics (branch
networks). Not only merging banks but also non-merging rival banks adjust their branch
networks after the mergers.
Step 5: Recover the post-merger deposit return rate from the post-merger exogenous
characteristics changes. And then the simulated market share and price can be obtained
Step 6: Compare the actual post-merger prices and the simulated prices.
First, I impose the projection of the post-merger evolution of branch networks. After
the merger, the post-merger exogenous characteristics can be predictable. For example, the
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post-merger number of counties reflects the sum of the counties that the two banks (i.e.
the merging bank and target bank) operate in pre-merger period. Similarly, post-merger
bank size can be predictable as the sum of two pre-merger asset sizes. The log value of
post-merger number of employees per branch is the pre-merger market share weighted
average of the two merging banks.
In addition, I assume that there are merger synergies in marginal costs if the post-merger
recovered deposit return rate is recovered from the predictions. Table 3 shows the estimation
results of the recovered deposit return rate. Also, I allow non-merging banks (i.e. rival
banks) to respond to mergers by adjusting their product quality (branch networks) in the
same market. According to Table 5, the simulated changes in the number of branches of
non-merging banks is usually a fraction. It is relatively so small that most of non-merging
banks retain their post-merger branch densities at the pre-merger level.
Table 7 shows the results of average changes in price, market shares after the mergers
and compare the simulation results with traditional model and real changes. I find that
post-merger prices increase but market share changes fall in real data. This is consistent
with Focarelli and Panetta (2003) that merging banks who obtain market power through
mergers set higher prices in the short time. It finds strong evidence that full price effects
of mergers can be revealed after 3 years following mergers. It implies that mergers cause
consumer-adverse changes in the short run but their long-run effect is beneficial to consumers.
However, considering long effects of mergers is difficult to separate the impact of one merger
and changes in economics environment.
The traditional method generates large prediction errors on the post-merger prices but a
good estimation at predicting post-merger market shares. I find that failing to take account
of post-merger changes of firm quality can tend to overestimate prices.
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2.7 Conclusion
This paper studies the merger simulation in U.S. commercial banking industry, using a
structural model of demand and supply of the deposit market. Peters (2006) and Weinberg
and Hosken (2008) notice that the change in supply is required to explain the difference
between simulated and actual price changes. Since the marginal cost can be recovered
from the demand and supply estimates, I model cost estimation to incorporate post-merger
branch networks and market competition. In addition to changes in supply, I include the
change in firm conduct in merger simulation. Mergers affect bank quality on not only
merging banks but also rival banks that are not involved in merger activities. I estimate
the changes of post-merger branch networks of merging banks and rival banks.
This paper attempts to reduce the discrepancy between the simulated and actual price
changes. However, this model has a limitation because it assumes merger activities as
exogenous and is a static model. Also, recent works13 suggest that inconsistent regulators
can increase the implicit costs for bank mergers. Antitrust enforcement and regulation
changes should be considered for the future work.
13Agarwal et al (2012)
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Table 2.2: Nested Logit Demand Estimation Results
(1) (2)
OLS IV
Explanatory Variables ln(Sj)− ln(S0) ln(Sj)− ln(S0)
Price −39.25(1.47)∗∗∗ −43.53(.90)∗∗∗
N of Branches .31(.004)∗∗∗ .24(.003)∗∗∗
N of Branches2 −.0015(9.0× 10−6)∗∗∗ −.0018(1.0× 10−6)∗∗∗
Headquarter in the county .95(.02)∗∗∗ 1.08(.04)∗∗∗
log Employees per branch .74(.018)∗∗∗ .82(.019)∗∗∗
Bank Size .14(.007)∗∗∗ .14(.008)∗∗∗
N of Branches of rival in the county −1.74(.033)∗∗∗ −1.43(.025)∗∗∗
ln(S¯j/g) .29(.047)
∗∗ .23(.031)∗∗
Market Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 17799 17799
R-squared 0.74 0.79
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
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Table 2.3: Estimated Own Price Elasticity
Model 10th Percentile 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile
Logit -4.17 -2.58 -1.36 -1.91
Table 2.4: OLS Regression of the Recovered Deposit Return Rate
Explanatory Variables rjm
log(N of Banks in the same market) −2.91× 10−4(.00006)∗∗∗
log(N of counties) −9.78× 10−4(.00008)∗∗∗
Mega −.0072(.0002)∗∗∗
Big −.0028(.0001)∗∗∗
Medium −.0017(.0001)∗∗∗
Constant .0515(.0002)∗∗∗
Year Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 17503
R-squared 0.4780
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
Table 2.5: OLS Regression of the Post-merger Changes of Branch Density of Merging Banks
in Texas
log N of Post-merger branches of merging banks
Explanatory Variables (1) (2)
log(sum of pre-merger branches) .982(.011)∗∗∗ .963(.016)∗∗∗
Market Overlap with Target banks −.147(.069)∗ −.137(.090)∗
Rival Overlap .093(.057)∗
Constant .106(.07)∗ .114(.075)∗
Observations 289 289
R-squared 0.95 0.96
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
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Table 2.6: OLS Regression of the Effects of Mergers on Changes of Branch Density of Rival
Banks in Texas
log N of branches
Explanatory Variables
(1) (2)
Bank Characteristics
logAsset .171(.01)∗∗∗ .177(.01)∗∗∗
log N of Counties −.275(.01)∗∗∗ −.278(.01)∗∗∗
Cost Efficiency .056(.01)∗∗∗ .073(.01)∗∗∗
Loan Loss Provisions .209(.20) −1.247(.34)∗∗∗
ROA .015(.01)∗∗∗ .023(.01)∗∗∗
Merger Effects
Rivals’ out-of-mkt merger .003(.01) .059(.01)∗∗∗
Rivals’ In-mkt merger −.124(.01)∗∗∗ −.022(.01)∗
1+ Year After Merger .063(.03)∗ .049(.02)∗∗∗
2+ Year After Merger .095(.03)∗∗ .046(.02)∗∗∗
4+ Year After Merger .134(.05)∗∗ .053(.02)∗∗∗
Market Structure
log(N of Banks) −.506(.01)∗∗∗ −.391(.04)∗∗∗
log County Pop 2000 −.064(.01)∗∗∗
log Per capita −.074(.02)∗∗∗
MSA Index .012(.01)∗
Fixed Effects Year County, Year
Observations 16765 16765
R-squared 0.35 0.31
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
Table 2.7: Summary of Average Post-merger Changes of Merging Banks and Prediction
Errors
Pre-merger Post-merger Prediction Error(%) Traditional Model(%)
Changes (actual) (%) comparison
(1) (2) (3)
Price Merging Bank 4.30 8.20 15.24
Market Share sum −7.37 11.91 5.20
Notes: Post-merger change=Post−merger−Premerger
premerger
, Prediction error=Prediction−postmerger
postmerger
.
Chapter 3
Estimation of Business Stealing and
Cannibalization Effect in Banking Industry
3.1 Introduction
Throughout the past decade, banking industry in the United States has undergone several
changes in both its structure and regulations. One important change is the passage of
the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, which permits
nationwide branching as of June 1997. This federal law allows banks to expand branch
networks through merger and acquisition or de-novo branching. After these regulations
were lifted, there has been considerable consolidations in banking industry. The number of
banks has shrunk but the number of branches has grown during the same time span.
Despite the growth of the use of Internet and mobile devices, branching is still the
most important way to collect deposits. Banks have expanded branch networks through
mergers and acquisitions. Given the importance of bank mergers in economy, it is crucial
for researchers to understand why banks want to extend branch networks into multiple
geographic markets. Aguirregabiria et al. (2013) find that banks can be beneficial by
reducing deposit and credit risk if they open branches in multiple markets.
The aim of this paper is to study the impact of market expansion on local market
structure. My paper is related to the literature on estimating entry models. Following
Berry (1992) and Berry and Waldfogel (1999), I study the nature of market competition by
examining cross-market relationships between the number of firms and deposits. The U.S
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banking industry after 1990s offers a good research environment to look for evidences about
the nature of competition and cannibalization, business stealing and market expansion
effects of new entry. To that effect, the location of a branch with respect to other branches
is crucial. Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) endogenize operating decisions of three types of
depository institutions: Multi-market banks, Single market banks and Thrift institutions,
and analyze how competitive effect influences market structure for all bank types in the
rural areas. A branch added to an incumbent market is not only just a form of entry but
also services to improve the quality of existing branches in the market. Davis (2006), who
studies the impact of new entry on movie theater industry, points out that excessive entry
was easily observed without considering business stealing effects.
Since most of new branch entry are made through mergers and acquisitions, I look into
how market competition affects the post-merger price changes following mergers. There’s
a significant on bank mergers in terms of price change. Most papers focus on the ex-post
price and performance change of the consolidated banks and rivals. Focarelli and Panetta
(2003) investigate the pricing effects of M&As in Italian banks and find that short-run
effects generate negative price changes to consumers but efficiency gains through mergers
lead to favorable price change in the long run. Sapienza (2002) and Erel (2011) analyze the
effects of mergers on loan spread, but reach different results. Sapienza (2002) finds that
horizontal mergers with small targets resulted in lower loan rate in Italy. Banks, however,
reduce lending to small borrowers after mergers. On the other hand, Erel (2011) notes
that the reduction in loan spreads is significant only for small loans, and finds that larger
acquirer does not drop small business lending of smaller targets. In addition, he points out
that in-market and out-of-market mergers have different effects on market structure and
efficiency.
Banks compete in retail markets by setting interest rates and the number of branches.
Then a tough rivalry reduces the interest rates and competition is enhanced. The traditional
entry literature models the profit function as a decreasing function of the number of active
operating firms. The number of firms or dominant firms are used to measure market
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competition. Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) propose a model of monopolistic competition in
branching to estimate the competitive response of banks. Dick (2006) points out that the
basic market structure hasn’t been affected throughout nationwide branching but the growth
in the tail of small banks are noticeable. When analyzing the impact of mergers among
incumbent banks, it is crucial to incorporate market competition and market structure
simultaneously into a model.
In this paper, I find some interesting features. First, I find evidence that business
stealing effects dominate cannibalization effects. Second, market competition effects can
be intensified when large banks with high quality enter. Third, competition impact is
localized while cannibalization effects are rather reversed at remote distances. Also, these
competition effects affect negatively merging banks when exerting market power after the
mergers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides data set I use and some
background on U.S. banking industry, and shows a brief descriptive evidence on branching
market competition. Section 3 introduces how branch networks grow on local markets.
In section 4, I develop the model of a bank’s branch entry choice and results. Section
5 provide evidence on market expansion effects. Section 6 evaluates the magnitudes of
business stealing and cannibalization effects. In section 7, I test how market competition
affects prices. Finally, I conclude.
3.2 Data and Descriptive Evidence
The dataset used is a cross-section of banking institutions between 1994 and 2001. Since
Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 removes intrastate and interstate branching restrictions on banks, I
observe a large volume of market expansion into multiple geographic markets. The data
contain commercial banks’ location and entry in Texas state, U.S. from 1994 to 2001.
Location of branches and branch level deposits can be obtained from Summary of Deposits
(SOD) as of June 30th of each year at the Federal Deposit Insurance Cooperation (FDIC).
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This also provides bank characteristics including branch address (zip code), location of
headquarters, whether a bank belongs to a bank holding company, and whether a bank was
a former savings association.
I use bank level data regarding balance sheet and income statement from the Report on
Condition and Income (Call reports) and Thrift Financial Reports in June from the Federal
Reserve Board. Call Reports contain information on asset, interest expenses on deposits,
interests income from loans, total employees and non-interest expenses including wages and
premises. I estimate the bank-level deposit interest rate as the ratio of interest expenses to
total domestic deposits. The interest rates and service fees are calculated as one year rates.
I define dummy variables for multi-market banks, single-market banks. “single-market bank”
has value of 1 if over 80% of its deposits were received from branches in a single county. It
is consistent with Cohen and Mazzeo (2007). Demographic data at county level are taken
from US Census 2000 and Bureau of Economics Analysis, which provides median household
income and total population for each county in Texas.
3.2.1 Single Market Bank vs Multi Market Bank
Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) analyze market structure with single market banks and multi
market banks. Single market banks (i.e small banks) behave differently and focus on
different targets. In 1995, average deposit interest rate offered by single market banks was
lower than that by multi market banks. The difference in average deposit rate was reduced
in 2001. Also, single market banks offer higher loan rate to borrowers compared to multi
market banks. On the other hand, service fees are stable over the years. Multi market
banks can provide non-performing loan less than single market banks because multi market
banks are large scale in general and are able to diverse geographical risk. But net charge
off rate of single market banks is much lower than multi market banks.
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3.2.2 Background and Descriptive Evidence
Figure 1 presents the cross-sectional distribution of the logarithm of deposits per branch
for 254 counties in Texas. Distributions in two panels have similar shape and spread.
This time-stability in the distribution of branch size implies that banks have increased
the number of branches to absorb the increasing deposits. More than 90% of the counties
have deposits per branch between $10 million and $40 million. This low dispersion in the
size of branches, despite the large heterogeneity in the market sizes of counties, suggests
that branches face substantial dis-economies of scale when growing in size. In order to
accommodate an increase in consumer supply of deposits, banks build more branches in
near distances.
After the Riegle-Neal act in 1994, financial institutions have extended branch networks
and a tremendous number of merge movements were noticed. Thus, banking industry
became more concentrated. Following Dunne et al. (1989), it is well known that average
entry rate is 14-19% annually and exit rate is lower than the entry rate in most industries.
Compared to other industries, Figure 2 shows that the exit rate is much higher than the
entry rate in banking industry. Figure 3 shows that most of the bank exits have taken place
through mergers and presents that the number of banks mergers is peaked around 1997 at
the time that the RN Act became effective and decreases steadily since 1999. Also It shows
that the percentage of within-state merger among total mergers in T.X stayed at 100 % but
dropped 80−90 % after interstate branching was allowed in 1998. In 2011, the fraction of
with-in state mergers dropped around 60 %. It implies that multi-state and multi-market
banks expand their branch networks rapidly after the Riegle-Neal Act.
Table 1 and 2 display the summary statistics of commercial banks and markets(i.e,
counties) in Texas. The number of counties each bank engages has grown from 1.6 in 1995
to 2.6 in 2005 and the number of branches that each bank occupy increases from 3.6 in
1995 to 7.86 in 2005. However, the employee per branch rather reduced. It is because of
the growth of ATM and mobile banking services. Table 2 shows that the average number
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of branches in a county grows from 13 to 17 in 10 years.
3.3 Branch Network Growth on Local Markets
Using this data, I am interested in studying the effects of bank branch network expansion
on local markets. One observable pattern of multi-market banks is that they open multiple
branches in the markets they enter, lending to branches of the same bank being located
near each other. As written in the 2007 New York Times article, “A Building Binge for
Bank Branches” by Amy Cortese, “It is not uncommon to see four or more branches on a
single city block or intersection”. Part of this can be attributed to some branch redundancy
resulting from many mergers and acquisitions. Most of de-novo branches have opened over
the last decade and they are located near the institutions’ existing branches. From 1999 to
2010, there were 25,294 de-novo branch openings, and approximately 73% of those openings
were operated by banks that already have existing branches in the same county.
One of the reasons that banks have dense branch networks is that branch networks
capture a larger share of market’s deposits. Figure 3 shows the relationship between a
bank’s market share of branches and its market-share of deposits. I find that there is a
positive relationship between branch networks and deposits collected. This network effect
influences banks to build dense branch networks, and discourages entry into new markets.
Following to Cohen and Mazzeo (2007), analysts have suggested that larger branch networks
may also serve as an advertising function because branches can be the “face” of the bank to
customers. Also, former Federal Reserve Governor Mark Olson noted that, “Branch offices
and networks continue to be critical factors to customers as they choose their financial
services providers... Surveys conducted by the Federal Reserve Board indicate that the
single most-important factor influencing a customer’s choice of banks is the location of the
institution’s branches”.
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3.3.1 Branch Creation through Mergers and De-novo Branches
In a local market, banks compete with each other for deposits. Let branch network (or
density), nimt be the number of branches that bank i has in market m at period t. Following
Aguirregabiria et al. (2013), I define the branch creation ∆nimt
∆nimt ≡ nimt − nimt−1 = ∆nMimt + ∆Dimt (3.1)
where ∆nMimt is the net change due to a merger or acquisition, and ∆
D
imt is the net change
due to de-novo openings or closing of branches. If bank i has not acquired during year t
any of branches in market m, then it is clear that the total net change can be attributed
to denovo branching. I only count these branch creation as a new entry. If bank i has
acquired other branches from target banks at year in market m, then I assume that there
has been first a merger and then a decision of opening or closing branches. When bank i
merge with target banks, then bank i absorbs all the branches of target banks and only
ownership is changed. In this case, there’s no new creation of branches in market m. Thus,
I only considers denovo branch creation, ∆Dimt as a new entry.
3.4 Market Structure and Competition
With a rich branch level deposit data and entry/exit/M&A information, the traditional
literature on entry, Bresnahan and Reiss (1987) and Berry (1992), examines the nature
of competition. It is common in the literature that the profit function is modeled as a
decreasing function of the number of active operating firms and the number of firms and
market size is used for a measure of competition.
3.4.1 Model
I use a reduced-form approach to estimate the impact of market competition on branch
deposits. Usually in one county, more than 5-6 banks and their 13-17 total branches exist.
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Following Berry and Waldfogel (1999) and Davis (2005), I incorporate market competition
into branch level deposit estimation. As new bank branch enters a given market, an entrant
steals from rival banks and cannibalizes some branches operated by the same bank. Berry
(1992) and Davis(2006) estimate variable profit equations for entry game. They show how
the entry affect firm revenue. However, I use local deposits from each branch in regression.
Because of data limitation, a bank’s revenue is not open to public. Also, interest rates
and costs should be considered to calculate bank’s revenue and it can bias the estimation
results.
I begin with a set of other branches in distance interval d for branch h in market m as
Γdhmt = {g ∈ 1, ..., Gm|0 < d(h, g) < d}. (3.2)
Also I define Jownhmt to be the set of branches in market m at the time t that are owned by the
same bank of branch h, and Jrivalhmt to be the set of branches that are owned by rivals of a
branch h in market m. If a branch g are in distance interval d and owned by the same bank
with a branch h, then g ∈ Γdhmt ∩ Jownhmt or owned by the rival banks, then g ∈ Γdhmt ∩ Jrivalhmt
For branch i in market m in time period t, I estimate a simple linear deposit function.
logDepositshmt = αhXh +
D∑
d=0
θownd W
d,0wn
hmt +
D∑
d=0
θrivald W
d,rival
hmt + µm + τt + ζhmt (3.3)
where Xh includes bank specific characteristics, W
d,0wn
hmt and W
d,rival
hmt are total counts of the
number of branches in distance d of branch h, that are owned by the same and rival banks.
I can rewrite W function as follows:
W d,0wnhmt =
∑
Γdhmt∩Jownhmt
1 and W d,rivalhmt =
∑
Γdhmt∩Jrivalhmt
1 (3.4)
Instead of dummy 1, then I can give different values on levels of bank sizes. The impact of
a new large bank entry is much bigger than small banks. First term provides an estimate of
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the bank-specific characteristics on branch deposits in the absence of any competitive firms.
Second term captures the deposit reducing (cannibalization) effects of the presence of the
branch owned by the same bank. Lastly, third term captures the deposit reducing (business
stealing) effects of the presence of bank branches owned by rival banks. I divide distances
between 2 branches into 3 categories. The number of branches in the same 5-digit zip code
level, county level and 3-digit zip code level.1 Since market structure variables are included
in the regression, potential endogeneity problem may occur. To address endogeneity issue,
I use an instrument market structure with population. Population is correlated with the
number of branches but is not correlated with unobserved variables.
Since new branch entry/exit is made by bank mergers, I incorporate merger effects in
estimation.
logDepositsimt = αiXi +
D∑
d=0
θownd W
d,0wn
imt +
D∑
d=0
θrivald W
d,rival
imt + µm + τt + ζimt
+ β1Inmerimt + β2Outmerimt + β3Rivalimt (3.5)
where Inmerimt and Outmerimt are the dummy variables that is set to 1 if a bank ,each
branch is owned by, is involved in in-market merger or out-of-market merger. Rivalimt the
dummies if rival’s banks that share the same market are involved in merger activities.
3.4.2 Results
Estimation results are presented in Table 4. Of interest are the variables related to market
structure. I find two trends from the estimation results. The deposits of each branch
are related to the changes in the number of own and rival branches in the vicinity. The
coefficients of business stealing and cannibalization effects show that a branch’s deposits
can be stolen by near own branches or rivals’ branches. For instance, the results in column
1ZIP codes are numbered with the first digit representing a certain group of U.S. states, the second and
third digits together representing a region in that group (or perhaps a large city) and the fourth and fifth
digits representing a group of delivery addresses within that region. For example, the first digit 7 is allocated
to Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas.
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(2) show that the expected decline in deposits for each new branch within the same county
is $9,110 if built by the same bank and $9,970 if built by the rival bank. I also find the
evidence that the impact of new branch creation on incumbent branch deposits is certainly
localized. As a new branch enters near incumbent branches, the deposit reducing effects
stealing from near branches is higher.
Table 5 presents the estimation results with merger effects. Deposits of branchi,m are
higher for larger banks with low price and higher bank quality. The results are almost
similar with Table 4. If a bank is involved in mergers in this period, deposits of branch
increase because merging banks earn market power or cost efficiency through merger. When
in-market merger occurred, branches of merging banks have positive effects on deposits since
banks obtain market power and less efficient branches can be removed. Thus, rival banks
encounter less competitive circumstances. Rival banks’ merger activities gives positive
effects on other branches in the same market. Following Park(2014), merging banks set
higher price in the short run and it can make rival banks attractive to consumers. Since
new branch enters a new market through out-of-market merger, the coefficient of own
out-of-market merger is negative. But increased branch network gives cost efficiency, which
it is inconclusive that the effect in bank level is negative.
Through the estimation, I can calculate median of each effects according to total branch
numbers in a market. The median cannibalization from the own banks is not zero.
3.5 New Banks and Market Expansion Effects
Berry and Waldfogel (1999) use cross-market evidences on the extent of the market expansion
effects of new product entry. Figure 7 shows the empirical relationship between the number
of bank branches in each market and a measure of market size, the number of labor force.
The number of branches has increased over the period in markets of each given size.
Depositsmt = α1Branchmt + α2Branch
2
mt + µm + τt + mt. (3.6)
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Market expansion regression is made upon market level data. Table 6 repost both OLS
and IV estimates of the baseline market expansion regression results, relating the level of
market deposits to the number of branches operating in that market. Two IV strategies are
examined. I use population and lagged population as IVs. If there is no market expansion
effect, then a new branch take deposits from incumbents branches including rivals and the
same banks rather than adding to them. Then both (α1, α2) will be zero and I can conclude
that there is excessive entry.
3.5.1 Results
Table 6 shows the relationship between market deposits and number of commercial bank
branches. This model includes a polynomial in the explanatory variable of interest, branch,
a total count of the number of branches in market m at time t. The results show that
market expansion effects are approximately $10,000 per branch. Since α1 is positive, then
I can conclude that market expansion effects of a new entry exist. But I find that α2 is
negative, ant I can imply that the rate of expansion effects declines as market size increases.
3.6 Evaluating the Market Expansion and Business Stealing Effects
I can decompose total deposits from each branch into three components.
H∑
g=1
Dˆgmt −
H∑
g 6=h
Dˆgmt = Dˆhmt
= αˆhXh −
D∑
d=0
θˆownd W˜
d,0wn
hmt −
D∑
d=0
θˆrivald W˜
d,rival
hmt .
The first component shows the deposits would be collected if there were no competitive
effects. The second and third components describe the reduction in deposits because of
cannibalization effects and business stealing effects, respectively. I calculate the three
components for each branch in each market and then average across branches and markets.
Figure 6 shows that the median cannibalization effect is not zero. But the business stealing
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effect from rival banks dominates as market size increases.
3.7 Impact of Mergers on Price Changes and Branch Networks
I analyze the business stealing and cannibalization effects of a new entry. I find that excess
entry can be observed without considering market competition. In section 7, I test how
market competition affects post-merger price changes.
3.7.0.1 Deposit Interest Rate
An ownership change in a market might influence non-merging rival banks that operate in
the regions affected by consolidation. After a merger happens, the pricing policy of the
merging bank affects the policies of the rival banks, too. To analyze the effects of mergers
on price and performance, I estimate the following fixed effect regressions.
rdepositk,t − rff = τ1Merget=0,−1,−2,−4k,t + τ2Moverlapk,t + τ3Bankk,t
+ λ1Mkt
comp
k,t + λ2Rival
Mer
k,t + dt + νkt
where rdeposit − rff is the relative deposit interest rate2 charged at time t by bank k,
measured by the difference between bank’s deposit rate and the three month federal funds
rates.3 Moverlapk,t measures the fraction of geographically overlapped markets between
mergers. Bankk,t is a vector of bank specific control variables. To measure bank size effects,
I add natural logarithm of bank k’s asset. To avoid simultaneity, all variables are lagged one
year. In particular, I distinguish rival banks from the other non-merging banks. In order to
examine whether rival banks’ activities affect interest rates, I create RivalMerk,t measured by
average rivals’ merger activities exposed in the same market that bank k engages. Focarelli
and Panetta (2003) find strong evidence that the full price effects of mergers can be revealed
after 3 years following mergers. Thus, time dummy variables are added. Merget=0,−1,−2,−4k,t
2The deposit, loan interest rates and service fee rates are calculated as one-year rates
3Radecki (1999) suggests federal funds rates as an approximation of foregone income for deposit balances.
However, London Inter Bank Offer Rate (LIBOR) also used for loan spread in Erel (2011).
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are dummy variables that is equal to 1 if bank k is involved in merger activities in year
t, t+ 1, t+ 2, t+ 4.
Table 13 presents the estimates of equation (6.1).4 It shows that in the transition
period the deposit interest rate of the merging (consolidating) banks decreases, while in
the completion period it increases by 11-14 basis points. This pattern is consistent with
Focarelli and Panetta (2003) that in the short run mergers cause consumer-adverse changes
but their long-run effect is beneficial. The coefficients of the bank characteristics are all
significant and have the expected signs. Deposit interest rates are lower for banks with high
ratio of cost measures. A large part of the increase in costs is accounted for by the rise in
salary expenses. High quality is negatively related to deposit rate. These interpretation is
consistent with many previous papers of consumer demand estimation. Loan loss provision
or net charge-off rate (bad loans) are used for proxies of credit risk. Also, deposit interest
rates are higher for larger and inefficient (low ROA) banks. As expected, market competition
enhances rivalry and lower the deposit rates. If the markets are more overlapped, the
effects of market power dominate cost efficiencies and interest rate changes unfavorably to
consumers.
3.7.0.2 Loan Interest Rates
Loan interest rates can be estimated by the following equation similar to deposit interest
rates.
rloank,t − rff = τ1Merget=0,−1,−2,−4k,t + τ2Moverlapk,t + τ3Bankk,t (3.7)
+ λ1Mkt
comp
k,t + λ2Rival
Mer
k,t + dt + νkt. (3.8)
Table 14 reports the estimation results. Different from deposit interest rate, determining
loan rates is more related to loan portfolio risks than merger effects. Rather, I find that the
favorable effect of mergers on loan rates starts after first year following the merger, but
4Note that the number of observations differs across columns because of some missing data.
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becomes significant after 4 years. Larger and high risky banks have lower loan interest
rates.
3.7.0.3 Service Fee Rate
Service fee rates can be estimated by following equation.
log(rss)− log(rsslag) = τ1Merget=0,−1,−2,−4k,t + τ2Moverlapk,t + τ3Bankk,t
+ λ1Mkt
comp
k,t + λ2Rival
Mer
k,t + dt + νkt.
Table 15 presents how characteristics of banks and merger activities affect service fee rates.
Service fee rate change after mergers has not been investigated in banking industry. It’s
because the relevant data are scarce and service rate has not been an interest of researchers.
It is obvious that service fee rate becomes the most compelling factor for customers since
deposit rates stay low after 2000s. I find that larger banks with high quality have higher
rates.
Service fee rates are vulnerable to merger activities of banks. As the fraction of market
overlap between mergers increases, service fee rates increase unfavorably to consumers
in the short term. After 2 years, service fee reversed beneficially to consumers. Market
externalities also influence the service fee change. The coefficients of merger activities of
rivals are different for merging banks and unmatched banks. Merger activities of rivals
lower service fee of merging banks but increase unmatched banks. It is consistent with the
results of matching model. Moreover, banks set low service fee in less concentrated and
competitive markets.
3.8 Conclusion
With a rich branch level deposit data and entry/exit/M&A information, I have examined the
nature of market competition. I analyze the effects of market deposit expansion, business
stealing from rival incumbent banks and cannibalization from other branches operated
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by the same bank. I find some interesting features. First, I find evidence that business
stealing effects dominate cannibalization effects. Second, market competition effects can
be intensified when large banks with high quality enter. Third, competition impact is
localized while cannibalization effects are rather reversed at remote distances. Also, these
competition effects affect negatively merging banks when exerting market power after the
mergers. Even though this business stealing model gives a good implication to understand
market competition in Banking Industry, it is a reduced-form approach and has a limitation.
The progress in dynamic entry models provide bases for future work.
3.9 A Comparison of Three Chapters
Throughout the three chapters, I analyzed the effects of bank mergers and market structure
after the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act in three perspectives.
In the first chapter, I apply matching model and extend the standard model to incorporate
externalities of market competition and the merger activities of rival banks. First chapter
shows that market overlap between matches play important roles in determining the post-
merger match values. This result is consistent with the traditional banking literature. The
net impact of bank mergers depend on the motivation of mergers, market power and cost
efficiency. Since these two effects are off-setting, market overlap term determines which
effect dominates. In-market mergers bring the loss of competition and consolidated banks
obtain market power. Thus I find that post-merger price will increase. Also, in-market
mergers offer more opportunities for cost efficiency than out-of-market mergers. The leaset
efficient branches can be eliminated through mergers. Similarly I study the post-merger
evolution of branch networks in merger simulation of chapter 2. The post-merger branch
networks depends on the overlapped markets between mergers. If a merger happens in
the same market, then the number of post-merger branches are less than the sum og the
number of pre-merger branches. If a bank enters a new market, then a merging bank wants
to increase branch densities to obtain market power.
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Throughout the two chapters, I find that competitive market structure affects negatively
on the bank values. The third chapter quantifies the market competition effects. I separates
the competitive effects of new entry of branches into business stealing from rival incumbents
and cannibalization from other branches operated by the same bank. But the competition
impact is localized while cannibalization effects are rather reversed.
Finally, I find the evidence that the ownership change can affect rival banks in the same
market. It is believed that the merger activities of rival banks weaken the merger effects.
However, the merger activities of rival banks that increase market power can give positive
effects on un-matched banks. Chapter 3 confirms the rival banks adopt the ”follower”
strategy when market power effects are dominant. Rival banks changes post-merger prices
unfavorably to customers.
Three different models show consistent results each other. Moreover, these yield useful
insight for banking industry. Nationwide branching and the resulting geographic diversifica-
tion have brought a more competitive banking environment, while massive consolidation
after Riegle-Neal Act has raised concerns over possible anti-competitive effects of mergers.
From the policy standpoint, competitive market structure should be considered for merger
analysis.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Commercial Banks in Texas
Year 1995 Year 2005
Variables
Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max
Assets ($ million) 20.7 172.5 .23 4.46E+03 521 5.92E+03 .27 1.05E+05
N of Branches 3.63 16.00 1 290 7.86 34.86 1 537
N of counties 1.60 3.35 1 70 2.60 5.41 1 78
Employees per branch 19.73 13.39 2.5 136 17.32 30.65 2.33 760.5
Market Share(%) .09 .58 0.01 12.09 .12 .94 0.01 18.81
N of Observations 972 693
Table 3.2: Market Characteristics Description in Texas
1994 2001
Variables
Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max
N of Banks 5.85 8.58 1 92 6.59 8.36 1 74
N of Branches 13.05 42.26 1 506 17.91 53.45 1 618
Total Deposits 583073 2430985 3530 2.71×107 877555 4025023 7242 5 ×107
County Population 83713 297271 851 3400578
labor force 39896 146822.6 353 1653892
Population over 16 62697 221181 681 2519937
Per Capita 16153 3387 5214 33345
Table 3.3: Frequency of the Number of Branches in Texas Counties (Year 2000)
Numbers
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Observations 22 31 22 27 16 10 13 18 9 5
Numbers
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Observations 6 7 4 10 2 1 3 2 2 2
Numbers
21 22 24 25 27 29 33 35 37 39
Observations 2 1 2 1 4 1 1 2 2 1
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Table 3.5: The Market Structure Determinants of Branch Deposits in Texas markets:
Merger Effects Included
(1) (2) (3)
Explanatory Variable log(Deposit) log(Deposit) log(Deposit)
Merger
Own(Out of market) −.013(0.003)∗∗∗ −.008(0.003)∗∗ −.013(0.003)∗∗∗
Own(In-market) .027(.01)∗ .037(0.01)∗∗ .014(0.01)
Rivals .0018(.0004)∗∗∗ .0041(0.0005)∗∗∗ .0017(.0004)∗∗∗
Cannibalization
5-digit Zipcode level −.050(.01)∗∗∗
County level −.0005(.0007) −.009(.001)∗∗∗ −.0038(.0009)∗∗∗
3-digit Zipcode level −.0094(.001)∗∗∗ −.0035(.001)∗∗∗ −.0010(.001)
Business stealing
5-digit Zip code −.062(.006)∗∗∗
County level .0001(.0001) −.008(.001)∗∗∗ −.0028(.0005)∗∗∗
3-digit Zip code −.0045(.0008)∗∗∗ −.0003(.0008)
Bank Quality
employees per branch .38(.015)∗∗∗ .37(.016)∗∗∗ .31(.016)∗∗∗
log(Asset) .173(.008)∗∗∗ .18(.008)∗∗∗ .15(.008)∗∗∗
Loan rate −7.55(1.14)∗∗∗ −7.59(1.22)∗∗∗ −2.50(1.33)∗
Deposit rate 20.78(2.29)∗∗∗ 18.96(2.38)∗∗∗ 11.21(2.50)∗∗∗
Service rate −19.61(1.50)∗∗∗ −20.26(1.56)∗∗∗ −48.78(2.61)∗∗∗
Single Market Bank −.35(.02)∗∗∗ −.36(.022)∗∗∗ −.31(.022)∗∗∗
Fixed Effects 3-digit Zip-code,Year County,Year 5-digit Zip-code,Year
Observations 23605 23605 23605
R-squared 0.87 0.87 0.89
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
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Table 3.6: The Market Expansion Effects of Entry of a New Branch
Pooled (1) (2) (3)
Cross-market OLS IV-I IV-II
Regression log(Deposit) log(Deposit) log(Deposit)
N of branches .039(.001) .037(.001) .037(.001)
(N of branches)2 −.0000553(2.62E−06) −.0000523(2.76E−06) −.0000537(2.75E−06)
MSA dummy .57(.05) .58(.05) .60(.05)
Fixed Effect Year Year Year
IV Lagged branch population
Observations 1992 1743 1992
R-squared 0.52 0.52 0.52
Within Martket (4) (5)
Regression OLS IV-II
log(Deposit) log(Deposit)
N of branches .104(.016) .032(.001)
(N of branches)2 -.0044(.0008) −.0000365(1.97E−06)
MSA dummy .57(.05) -1.19(.17)
IV Population
Fixed Effect Year,County Market Year,County Market
Observations 1336 1992
R-squared 0.94 0.94
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Table 3.7: Effects of M&As on Deposit Interest Rates on Texas Bank between 1995 and
2005
log(rd) -log(rff )
Merging Banks Only All Banks
Explanatory Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
logAssets .008(.01) .041(.04) .023(.01)∗∗∗ .16(.01)∗∗∗
Cost efficiency −.193(.05)∗∗∗ −.017(.03) −.157(.01)∗∗∗ −.034(.01)∗∗∗
ROA −.044(.02) −.001(.02) −.024(.01)∗∗∗ −.007(.01)∗∗∗
Net Charge-Off rate .030(.01)∗∗ .084(.07) .014(.01)∗∗ .002(.01)
Loan Loss Provision −1.11(.81) −4.14(4.92) −2.52(.32)∗∗∗ −.57(.33)∗∗∗
Merger overlap −.074(.03)∗∗ .047(.04) −.078(.02)∗∗∗ −.005(.03)
Concentration −1.55(.63)∗∗ .114(.04)∗∗∗ −.014(.05)
market competition −.084(.02)∗∗∗ −.268(.07)∗∗∗ −.041(.01)∗∗∗
Rival Merger :Match −.023(.05) .089(.05) −.115(.05)∗∗ −.064(.04)
Rival Merger:Unmatch −.043(.01)∗∗∗
1+ Year After Merger −.052(.06) .032(.04) −.030(.01)∗∗ −.044(.01)∗∗∗
2+ Year After Merger −.111(.08) −.122(.06)∗ −.040(.02)∗∗ −.044(.01)∗∗
4+ Year After Merger .116(.05)∗∗ .142(.06)∗∗ −.010(.03) −.013(.03)
Fixed Effects Year Bank,Year Year Bank,Year
Observations 264 264 8560 8560
R-squared 0.68 0.53 0.59 0.42
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
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Table 3.8: Effects of M&As on Loan Interest Rates on Texas Banks between 1995 and 2005
log(rl) -log(rff )
Merging Banks Only All Banks
Explanatory Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log Assets −.022(.01)∗∗ −.034(.03) −.043(.01)∗∗∗ .004(.01)
Cost efficiency −.006(.03) −.020(.03) .042(.01)∗∗∗ .001(.01)
ROA .006(.01) −.011(.01) .042(.01)∗∗∗ .018(.01)∗∗∗
Net Charge-Off rate .014(.01)∗ .017(.05) .039(.01)∗∗∗ .017(.01)∗∗∗
Loan Loss Provisions 2.79(.80)∗∗∗ 2.02(.32)∗∗∗ 1.08(.28)∗∗∗
Merger overlap .029(.02) .022(.04) −.009(.01) .021(.02)
Concentration .407(.20)∗∗ .052(.05)
Market competition −.172(.05)∗∗∗ −.004(.01)∗
Rival Merger :Match −.020(.05) .068(.04) −.020(.05) −.029(.03)
Rival Merger :Unmatch .003(.01) .001(.01)
1+ Year After Merger .009(.02) .004(.03) −.015(.01) −.015(.01)
2+ Year After Merger .059(.02)∗∗ .024(.03) −.014(.014) −.012(.02)
4+ Year After Merger −.065(.04) −.092(.05)∗∗ .010(.01) −.036(.01)∗∗
Fixed Effects Year Bank,Year Year Bank,Year
Observations 264 264 8560 8560
R-squared 0.81 0.74 0.84 0.88
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
100
Table 3.9: Effects of M&As on Service Fee Rates on Texas Banks between 1995 and 2005
log(rss)− log(rsslag)
Merging Banks Only All Banks
Explanatory Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log Assets .027(.01)∗ .158(.21) .018(.01)∗∗∗ .064(.01)∗∗∗
Cost efficiency .657(.10)∗∗∗ .711(.26)∗∗∗ .350(.03)∗∗∗ .344(.01)∗∗∗
ROA .067(.02)∗∗ .129(.10) .043(.00)∗∗∗ .052(.01)∗∗∗
Net Charge-Off rate .009(.01) .350(.18)∗ .010(.01)∗∗ .005(.01)
Loan Loss Provisions 11.13(4.02)∗∗∗ 21.10(17.8) 1.94(.93)∗∗ 1.68(.60)∗∗∗
Merger overlap .057(.04) .431(.13)∗∗∗ .079(.04)∗∗ .088(.04)∗∗
Concentration .977(.39)∗∗ 3.94(1.7)∗∗
Market competition −.024(.01)∗∗∗ −.037(.01)∗∗∗
Rival Merger : Match −.121(.07) −.220(.15) −.169(.06)∗ −.128(.06)∗∗
Rival Merger : UnMatch .003(.01) .043(.01)∗∗∗
N of county .194(.07)∗∗∗ .159(.01)∗∗∗ .025(.01)∗∗∗ .026(.01)∗∗∗
1+ Year After Merger .030(.05) -.080( .09) .030(.01)∗ .027(.02)
2+ Year After Merger −.182(.08)∗∗ −.295(.12)∗∗ −.036(.02) −.048(.02)∗
4+ Year After Merger −.172(.05)∗∗∗ −.300(.17)∗ −.049(.02)∗∗ −.060(.03)∗
Fixed Effects Year Bank,Year Year Bank,Year
Observations 288 288 8560 8560
R-squared 0.54 0.46 0.19 0.23
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
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Figure 3.1: Cross-sectional Distributions of the Logarithm of Deposits per Branch in Texas
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Figure 3.2: Entry rate and exit rate in Texas
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Figure 3.3: The Relationship between a Bank’s Market-shares of Branches and of Deposits
with Populations over 100,000 people in Texas
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Figure 3.4: Number of Mergers and Percentage of Within-state mergers in Texas
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